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WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
LAW QUARTERLY
Volume 1954 February, 1954 Number 1
BULK SALES LAWS: BUSINESSES INCLUDED*
FRANK W. MILLER "
1. INTRODUCTION
If, at common law, a stock of goods was sold out of the ordinary
course of trade, the purchaser took the goods free and clear of any
claims of the seller's unsecured creditors, provided only that he did not
share any fraudulent intent which the seller might have had., Al-
though such a sale was under some circumstances affixed with a "badge
of fraud" by some courts,/ this procedural advantage was denied credi-
tors by other courts. As the practice of selling one's stock of goods
quickly, usually at a below-fair-value price, and departing with the
proceeds became commonplace in the 1890s, creditors found themselves
deprived of the very items which served as the basis for their extension
of credit, as well as of the debtor himself, for it was not often that the
purchaser failed to overcome the presumption of fraud raised against
him, if indeed any existed.
Conceived by the National Association of Credit Men at the turn of
the century in response to the wave of dissatisfaction which grew out
of such a state of affairs,, bulk sales statutes are now a part of the
This is the first in a series of three articles by Professor Miller considering
the problem of the kinds and quantity of goods, and the kinds of business covered
by the bulk sales statutes. Bulk Sales Laws: Property Included, and Bulk Sales
Lawiv: Meaning to be Attached to the Quantitative and Qualitative Requirements
Phrases of the Statutes, will appear in the April and June, 1954, issues of the
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QuARTERLY, respectively.
If Associate Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law.
1. See the excellent discussion of the common law situation just prior to the
adoption of bulk sales statutes in Billig, Bulk Sales Laws: A Study in Economic
Adjustment, 77 U. of PA. L. REV. 72, 75 et. seq. (1928).
2. E.g., Pennell v. Robinson, 164 N.C. 257, 80 S.E. 417 (1913). 1 GIENN,
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES § 309 (Rev. ed. 1940) states that
this is the common law rule.
3. Hart v. Roney, 93 Md. 432, 49 Atl. 661 (1901). And see Note, 72 CENT. L.J.
300 (1911).
4. Billig, supra note 1, at 75-80.
5. Id. at 81-88.
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
law of every state, and the District of Columbia.7 In brief the statutes
provide either that a sale of the type proscribed may be avoided by
existing creditors of the seller if the statute is not complied with, or
that a presumption of fraud is raised by non-compliance. Compliance
usually takes the form of the preparation of an inventory, the securing
of a list of the seller's creditors, and notification of those creditors in
some specified way a certain number of days prior to the consumma-
tion of the transaction.8 The purpose of the statutes is to give advance
notice to creditors so that they can survey the situation, determine
whether there are any legal steps available to them, and, if there are,
take those steps.9
It seems to have been commonly assumed, however, that the various
statutes are sufficiently homogeneous to warrant treatment of them as
a class, and, more importantly, that reasonably accurate generaliza-
tions may be stated about their operation and effect, i.e., that bulk
6. ALA_ CODE tit. 20, §§ 10-14 (Supp. 1952); ARiz. CODE ANN. § 58-301 (1939);
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 68-1501 to 68-1504 (1947); CAL. CirV. COD§ 5 3440.1 (Supp.
1953); COLO. STAT. ANN. C. 27, H 1-3 (Supp. 1952)- CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 6705-
6707 (1949); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §9 2101-2104 (1953); FLA. STAT. ANN. 9
726.02-726.06 (1944); GA. CoD ANN. H9 28-203 to 28-206 and 28-9901 (1952);
IDAHO CODE ANN. 55 64-701 to 64-705 (1948); ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 121%, 5H 78-80a
(Supp. 1952); IND. ANN. STAT. 55 33-201 to 33-203 (Burns 1949); IOWA CODE
ANN. c. 555, H§ 555.1 to 555.5 (1950); KAN. GEN. STAT. 55 58-101 to 58-104
(1949); Ky. REv. STAT. 55 377.010 to 377.990 (1953); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§
9:2961 to 9:2968 (1950); ME. RE. STAT. C. 106, 5H 6-7 (1944); MD. ANN. CODE
GEN. LAWS art. 83, §5 97-101 (1951); MAss. ANN. LAws c. 106, H5 1-2 (1947);
MICH. STAT. ANN. 55 19.361-19.363 (bulk sales), 19.371-19.373 (bulk mortgages)
(1937) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 513.18 (West 1947); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 274, 277
and 278 (1942); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 427.010-427.050 (Vernon 1950); MONT. REV.
CODES ANN. 5H 18-201 to 18-205 (1947); NES. REv. STAT. 55 36-501 to 36-502
(1952); NEv. COMP. LAWS 55 6816-6820 (Supp. 1949); N.H. REV. LAWS e. 262,
55 43-44 (1942); N.J. STAT. ANN. 55 46:29-1 to 46:29-3 (1940); N.M. STAT. ANN.§5 53-1001 to 53-1003 (1941); N.Y. PES. PROP. LAW § 44 (bulk sales), N.Y.
LIEN LAW § 230a (bulk mortgages); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-23 (1950); N.D. REV.
CODE §5 51-0201 to 51-0204 (1943); OHIo GEN. CODE ANN. 55 11102 to 11103-1
(1938); ONKLA STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 71-74 (1937); Ore. Laws 1949, c. 435; PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 69, H5 521-529 (1931) (but subsequent to July 1, 1954 Article 6
of the UN'ROI COMER cIAL CODE will govern the law of bulk transfers in Penn-
sylvania) ; R.I GEN. LAWS c. 483, 55 1-2 (1938); S.C. CODS 55 11-201 to 11-206
(1952) ; S.D. CODS 5 54.0301 to 54.0308 and 55.9901 (1939); TENN. CODE ANN.
55 7283-7285 (Williams 1934) ; T . RE. Cxv. STAT. ANN. arts 4001-4003 (1945) ;
UTAH CODS. ANN. 55 25-2-1 to 25-2-5 (1953); VT. RE. STAT. 55 7846-7847 (1947);
VA. COD 55 55-83 to 55-86 (1950); WAsH. RE. CODS 55 63.08.010 to 63.08.060
(1951); W. VA. CODS ANN. 55 4001-4006 (1949) ; Wis. STAT. 55 241.18 to 241.21
(1951); WYO. COMP. STAT. ANN. 55 41-701 to 41-703 (1945).
7. D.C. CODE ANN. H5 28-1701 to 28-1705 (1951).
8. In addition, several of the statutes impose on the purchaser the duty of
making certain that the proceeds are applied to the payment of the seller's
debts. IDAHO CODE ANN. 5 64-702 (1948); KY. P s. STAT. 9 377.040 (1953); LA.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:2963 (1950); MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAwS art. 83, § 98
(1951) ; MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 18-202 (1947); NEV. COMP. LAWS 5 6817
(Supp. 1949); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 69, § 523 (1931); UTAH CODE ANN. 5 25-2-2
(1953); WASH. REV. CODE 5 63.08.050 (1951).
9. See, Harris, The Bulk Sale as a Vehicle for Effecting Out-of-Court Settle-
ments with Creditors, 55 Cow. L.J. 317 (1950), for a good discussion of the
alternatives available to the creditors if the bulk sales statute has been complied
with.
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sales statutes and the decisions under them lend themselves to synthe-
sis in the same manner that a group of common law cases do. 0 It is the
thesis of this and other articles in this series that the conclusions
which may be drawn from a consideration of the statutes and cases
as a hoknogeneous group, while not inaccurate in a technical sense,
must of necessity be so general as to be nearly valueless in solving the
specific problems which arise under the statutes. Furthermore, the
value of such generalizations to an understanding of how well the
legislatures and courts acting together have solved a specific problem
of sufficient importance to stimulate legislation on it by all state legis-
latures within a short span of years is likewise doubted.
Implicit in these statements is the idea that the variations, even
within the traditional grouping of the statutes, are more marked than
seems generally to have been recognized." Particularly is that as-
sumption justified in a consideration of the general problem of the
kinds and quantity of goods, and the kinds of businesses covered by
them, and it is the purpose of this series of articles to examine in
detail that general problem. Every effort will be made to illustrate
the thesis set out above. In the instant article consideration of the
general problem will be confined to that part of it relating to busi-
nesses covered.
It is important to keep uppermost in mind the fact that this analysis
is of necessity concerned with the effect of the superimposition of a
statutory scheme on the common law. Thus attention must first be
directed to the statutory construction aspects of the problem, and
more particularly to the part, if any, played by the so-called canons of
statutory interpretation.
The idea that courts cannot avoid the responsibility of distinguish-
ing the variant elements in a relatively complex legislative scheme can
be illustrated in no better manner than by examining the results and
techniques of litigation which has arisen under bulk sales statutes.
The problem, basically, is one of resolving a conflict of interests be-
tween the buyer on the one hand and the creditors of the seller on the
other, between security of acquisitions and security of contracts. 2
Professor Void has said that the conflict is reflected in the variance in
the decisions on whether the statutes are to be liberally or strictly
construed." But a study of the cases supports the thesis that generali-
10. Beyond the now traditional breakdown into the so-called "four forms,"
there seems to have been little attempt made to emphasize the numerous variants
in the statutes. The breakdown is into the forms of the statutes in New York,
Pennsylvania, Montana and Connecticut, although by reason of amendment the
classification is no longer accurate. See, Llewellyn, CAsEs AND MA.=ALS ON
SALES 905 et seq. (1930).
11. See note 10 supra.
12. VOLD, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF SALES 404 (1931).
13. Id. at 407-8.
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zation is not helpful. The purpose of this part of the article is to
demonstrate the soundness of the thesis by representative illustration.
Of the courts which have apparently adopted an attitude toward the
bulk sales statutes of their states which may be described as
"friendly," and have been fairly consistent in their treatment of the
statutes through a series of cases, the Supreme Court of Michigan
stands out. In Watkins v. Angus,14 at a time when he was indebted
to the plaintiff, Angus sold a one-half interest in his retail coal busi-
ness to the garnishee defendant who thus became his (Angus') part-
ner. About one and one-half years later, Angus sold his remaining one-
half interest to the garnishee defendant. The court held that both
transactions were within the purview of the Michigan bulk sales
statute, stating that since the statute was remedial in character, it
should be given that construction which will effectuate its clear pur-
pose.I The problem in Patmos v. Grand Rapids Dairy Co." was whether
the sale of the entire business of a dairy cooperative engaged in ob-
taining, pasteurizing, and peddling out or selling at its retail store
milk, cream and butter, was a business covered by the bulk sales
statute. The court reiterated its statement that the statute was reme-
dial and ". . . should be construed so as to cure the evil at which it
was aimed, defrauding creditors by secret bulk sales, . . .""1 holding
that the sale of such a business was within the statute. The sale of
fixtures alone of a grocery store was held within the statute in Elliott
Grocer Co. v. Field's Pure Food Market, Inc.,'7 the court again ad-
hering to its rule of liberal construction.
These examples were selected because they represent situations in
which there is a wide conflict in the case-law. Courts have been in
disagreemhent as to whether a partner's interest in a stock of goods is
a "part" or "portion" of the goods because of the limited nature of a
partner's interest in the partnership property. Again, what consti-
tutes a "stock of merchandise" has been answered in a multitude of
ways by courts. The same may be said of the question of whether the
sale of fixtures, particularly when they are not sold as a part of a
transaction also involving the sale of merchandise, is within the
statute. The point is simply that in all three cases the decisions re-
flected an attitude more friendly to the statute and to the creditors of
the seller than would be the attitude of many courts on the same facts.
Other Michigan cases, not nominally controlled by any rule of con-
struction, support this conclusion.' 8
14. 241 Mich. 690, 217 N.W. 894 (1928).
15. 243 Mich. 417, 220F N.W. 724 (1928).
16. Id. at 420, 220 N.W. at 725.
17. 286 Mich. 112, 281 N.W. 557 (1938).
18. National Grocery Co. v. Plotler, 167 Mich. 626, 133 N.W. 493 (1911)
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But in 1947 the Michigan court was called upon to decide whether
a tool, die, fixture, nut and guage manufacturing business was covered
by the statute, and the court held that it was not.,, The court still
purported to be following its rule of liberal construction, but it indi-
cated that any further extension of the act would have to come from
the legislature. Although this decision may be proper and not incon-
sistent with earlier Michigan cases, yet it should be noted that at least
one court has included a manufacturing business among those covered
by its statute.!--
it may be contended that this means no more than that Michigan
is retreating from its traditional role as the leader of those courts
which are friendly to bulk sales statutes. I suggest, however, that it
rather means that on this particular point-what businesses are cov-
ered-the court is not convinced that there are frequent instances,
outside the exclusively mercantile businesses, where creditors are
defrauded by secret sales. Consequently the court does not think that
such a transfer should be treated in the same way as transfers of the
goods of a retail grocer, for example. It is not a question of "dis-
covering meaning"; it is the making of a value judgment where evi-
dence of the legislative intent with respect to this particular point is
lacking.'' We may generalize from this that even the court most con-
sistently friendly towards bulk sales statutes will, in some instances,
(subrogation denied); Interstate Shirt & Collar Co. v. Windham, 165 Mich. 648,
131 N.W. 102 (1911) (affidavit must clearly state that there are no creditors
in order to satisfy requirements); People's Saving Bank v. Van Allsburg, 165
Mich 524, 131 N.W. 101 (1911) (sale of undertaking establishment, which sold
caskets as well, within the statute); Hannah v. Hurley, 162 Mich. 601, 127 N.W.
710 (1910) (contingent liability within statute); Marquette County Savings
Bank v. Koivisto, 162 Mich 554, 127 N.W. 680 (1910) (finding of no estoppel on
disputed facts); Porter v. Goudzwaard, 162 Mich. 158, 127 N.W. 295 (1910)(same); Musselman Grocer Co. v. Kidd, Dater & Price Co., 151 Mich. 478, 115
N.W. 409 (1908) (garnishment is a proper remedy in case of a sale in violation
of the bulk sale statute). Compare J. L. Hudson Co. v. No-Name Hat Co., 174
Mich. 109, 140 N.W. 507 (1913) (purchaser cannot take advantage of fact that
property purchased was exempt in hands of seller), with McCormick v. Kistler,
175 Mich. 422, 141 N.W. 593 (1913). In the latter case the court distinguished
the Hudson case on the ground that there the total goods sold exceeded in value
the $250 exemption, wheras in the instant case, they did not. Examples of a
strict construction are not lacking, however. See, e.g., Symons Bros. Co. v.
Brink, 187 Mich. 43, 153 N.W. 359 (1915), holding that a chattel mortgage on
a stock of goods is not a sale or assignment within the statute. The court fol-
lowed the earlier case of Hannah & Hogg v. Richter Brewing Company, 149 Mich.
220, 112 N.W. 713 (1907).
19. Frederick v. Dettary Engineering Co., 318 Mich. 252, 28 N.W.2d 94 (1947).
20. Root Refineries v. Gay Oil Co., 171 Ark. 129, 284 S.W. 26 (1926). It
should be noted, however, that the court was careful to point out that the sale
of the manufactured products was not merely incidental to the manufacturing
business, for in the latter situation the court had already held that such a
business is outside the scope of the statute. See, Ramey-Milburn Co. v. Sevick,
159 Ark. 358, 252 S.W. 20 (1923). See infra, Section 2, b., for a discussion of the
cases relating to manufacturing businesses.
21. Note, 20 IowA L. REv. 815 (1935). See, generally, Radin, Statutory In-
terpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863 (1930) for a brilliant treatment of the problem.
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
stop short of rendering a construction as favorable to the creditors as
could be justified. No more can be said than that as the problem
presented reaches the outer limit of the area of permissible construc-
tion, the court's judgment as to what "ought to be" the stopping point
manifests itself sufficiently so that the members of the court are no
longer willing to favor the creditor, and this is true despite the fact
that the language of the statute is sufficiently broad to give the court
a clear choice in the matter.
On the other hand a majority of the courts have announced a rule
of strict construction based on an application of the rule that statutes
in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed. Among
the supporting reasons for applying the rule are (1) that the statutes
tend to restrict the right to alienate property freely,2 2 (2) that they
tend to restrict the right to enter into contracts of sale and purchase, 2
3
(3) that the statutes are penal in nature,24 and (4) that they are
"stringent" 2 and "drastic." 26 Here, however, even less consistency
within any given jurisdiction can be found.
The Indiana cases, while perhaps the best for illustrative purposes,
are not unrepresentative. In Fairfield Shoe Co. v. Olds, 2 one partner
sold his interest in the partnership to another partner. The Supreme
Court of Indiana said that since the bulk sales statute is in derogation
of the common law, it is to be strictly construed. Therefore, the trans-
fer of an interest in a partnership, not being expressly covered by the
words of the statute, falls outside its scope. Thirteen years later the
22. Boise Assn. of Credit Men v. Ellis, 26 Idaho 438, 144 Pae. 6 (1914); St.
Mathews Motor Co. v. Schnepp, 306 Ky. 823, 209 S.W.2d 481 (1948); Bater
and Miller v. Crum, 199 Mo. App. 380, 203 S.W. 506 (1918) [The case is of
dubious validity as a precedent, however, since in Turner v. Drees Hardware &
Furniture Co., 207 Mo. App. 567, 227 S.W. 1085 (1921), the Springfield Court
of Appeals said that the Mo. Laws 1917, p. 324, providing that no statute $hall
be limited in its scope or effect for the reason that the same may be in derogation
of the common law, but such acts shall be liberally construed so as to effectuate
their true intent and meaning, was controlling. It is worthy of note, however,
that "liberal construction" in the Turner case resulted in a construction in favor
of the purchaser, not the creditor. The St. Louis Court of Appeals adopted a
rule of "reasonable construction" when the two cases were called to its attention.
Rothenheber v. Pulitzer Publishing Co., 262 S.W. 48 (Mo. App. 1924).]; Brown
v. Frank, 121 Ore. 482, 256 Pac. 190 (1927); Gitt v. Hoke, 301 Pa. 31, 151 Atl.
585 (1930); York v. Ambrose, 156 Tenn. 314, 300 S.W. 586 (1927); O'Connor
v. Smith, 188 Va. 214, 49 S.E.2d 310 (1948) ; Blanchard Co. v. Ward, 124 Wash.
204, 213 Pac. 929 (1923).
23. Meier Electric and Machine Co. v. Dixon, 81 Ind. App. 400, 143 N.E. 363(1924); United Sales Promotion Co. v. Anderson, 100 Ohio St. 58, 125 N.E. 107
(1919).
24. Gitt v. Hoke, 301 Pa. 31, 151 Atl. 585 (1930) ; York v. Ambrose, 156 Tenn.
314, 300 S.W. 586 (1927) [contra, Daly v. Sumpter Drug Co., 127 Tenn. 412, 155
S.W. 167 (1912)]; Nichols, North Buse Co. v. Belgium Cannery, 188 Wis. 115,
205 N.W. 804 (1925); Missos v. Spyros, 182 Wis. 631, 197 N.W. 196 (1924).
25. Axisto Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Ramsbottom, 46 R.I. 505, 129 Atl. 503 (1925).
26. Schwartz v. King Realty & Investment Co., 93 N.J.. 111, 107 Atl. 60(Sup. Ct. 1919); Muller v. Hubschman, 84 N.J. Eq. 30, 96 At. 189 (Ch. 1914).
27. 176 Ind. 526, 96 N.E. 592 (1911).
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Indiana Court of Appeals held that the sale of a hotel and sanitarium,
including furniture, fixtures, dishes, cutlery and stoves, was not within
the statute. The Court said:
Any statute which attempts to restrict this right [privilege of
entering into or making contracts] is in derogation of the common
law and must be strictly construed; it will not be extended by
implication or construction to classes of persons not fairly within
the letter of the statute.25
But when we turn to Wright v. Hatey,2 decided in 1935 by the
Supreme Court of Indiana, we find that the lessor of the bulk seller
was considered a creditor within the meaning of that term in the bulk
sales statute on the following facts. The seller had no creditors except
his landlord, under whom the seller was a lessee for a term of years.
At the time of the sale the rent was not in default. Again, the decision
may be sound, but it is, nevertheless, a "liberal" one.
The Indiana cases lead to the conclusion that the announced rule of
strict construction is merely a convenient way of rationalizing a de-
sired result. The presence of the rule certainly does not mean that
the Indiana courts will hold for the purchaser in every situation where
the statutory language will bear that construction, although it may in-
dicate a general attitude on the whole less friendly toward its statute
than the attitude of the Michigan court.
Examples might be multiplied, but such duplication would serve no
useful purpose at this point. The same problems presented above, i.e.,
( 1 ) who is a creditor, (2) what businesses are covered, (3) what kinds
of transfers are covered, (4) what kinds of goods are covered, as well
as many others, have arisen over and over again in cases where there
has been no specific reliance placed on any rule of statutory construc-
tion. The answers to such problems are controlled by considerations
other than a rule of construction."' At most the announced rule bol-
28. Meier Electric and Machine Co. v. Dixon, 81 Ind App. 400, 402, 143 N.E.
363, 364 (1924).
29. 208 Ind. 46, 194 N.E. 637 (1935).
30. It is of course possible to take the position that the original tendency to
construe bulk sales statutes strictly is giving way to a rule of liberal construction
because the courts have become more familiar with and, consequently, less dis-
trustful of such legislation. Professor Void so says (VoId, op. cit. supra note
12, at 404) and there is evidence to bear him out. See the Missouri cases dis-
cussed suspra note 22. Compare Apex Leasing Co. v. Litke, 173 App. Div. 323,
159 N.Y. Supp. 707 (1st Dep't 1916), with Himmelstein v. Bach, 261 App. Div.
57, 24 N.Y.S.2d 696 (3d Dep't 1941); see also, Preferred Oil Co. v. Ansonia Man-
agement Corp., 257 App. Div. 830, 11 N.Y.S.2d 998 (2d Dep't 1939). See also,
Billig and Smith, Bulk Sales Laws: A Study in Statutory Interpretation, 38
W. VA. L.Q. 309 (1932); comment, 35 CoL. L. REv. 795 (1935). It is also true
that the passage of general statutes instructing courts to construe statutes liber-
ally in order to effectuate their purposes, and thus eliminating the derogation
rule, either expressly or by implication, has already changed the rule in onejurisdiction. See the Missouri cases discussed supra, note 22, and see also, Peter-
son Co. v. Freeburn, 204 Iowa 644, 215 N.W. 746 (1927). Mr. Justice Walling took
cognizance of a tendency toward liberal construction in Broad Street National
Washington University Open Scholarship
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sters the court's otherwise-arrived-at conclusion in any given case. By
grouping the cases with reference to the particular problem raised by
them, it is possible to arrive at some general conclusions as to whether
the courts have given a "strict-in-fact" or "liberal-in-fact" construc-
tion to the statutes for the purpose of deciding one kind of bulk sales
case.
But even within those arbitrary limits there is the danger of over-
looking the significant dissimilarities between the statutes.
II. THE PRESENT STATUTES
Two major obstacles stand in the way of any non-parochial dis-
cussion of what businesses are covered by bulk sales statutes: (1) a
fact that has already been adverted to, i.e., the language of the statutes
varies greatly, which makes generalization difficult, though by no
means impossible, and (2) the fact that the problem cannot be isolated
entirely from the problem of what kinds of goods are covered. The
latter problem will be treated separately,3 1 however, because the con-
siderations which underlie it are somewhat different from those which
underlie the instant problem.
While it is possible to classify the kinds of businesses covered or not
covered on several different bases (e.g., the statutes might be grouped,
with each type of statute considered in relation to each possible kind of
business), both logic and preference dictate a classification based on
seven kinds of businesses to which bulk sales acts might be applied
and to which an attempt has been made to apply at least one of them.
In addition to those businesses which fall within the seven principal
groups, there are a substantial number of businesses to which bulk
sales acts might be applied, but which in fact have characteristics
common to more than one of the principal groups which, therefore,
prevent their classification exclusively within any of the seven groups.
Bank v. Lit Bros., 306 Pa. 85, 158 Atl. 866 (1932), but refused to use it to extend
coverage of the statute to a manufacturing business.
It has also been stated in the cases that even though the statute viewed as a
whole is to be constructed strictly, its remedial portions should be liberally con-
strued. See the dissenting opinion in Adams-Flanigan Co. v. DiDonato, 180 App.
Div. 342, 346, 167 N.Y. Supp. 948, 950 (1917). In Hughes-Curry Packing Co. v.
Sprague, 200 Ind. 540, 165 N.E. 318 (1929), the court announced the derogation
rule as being applicable ..... except under certain conditions as to notice to
creditors .... " Id. at 542, 165 N.E. at 319.
I do not disagree with these conclusions. In fact I will point out in subsequent
sections of this and other articles in the series that courts have frequently
given a "liberal-in-fact" construction to certain problems arising under these
statutes even though the same courts purport to be operating under the derogation
rule generally. My position is simply that generalizations of this nature are of
no value, and that, in any event, a further investigation must be made each
time one of the recurring problems arises as to what the courts have done with
that kind of problem See also, Billig and Branch, supra, this footnote.
31. See Miller, Bulk Sale Laws: Property Included, to be published in the April,
1954 issue of the Washington University Law Quarterly.
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The latter businesses will be treated miscellaneously, not because they
are unimportant, for they present some of the most difficult problems
of all, but merely for convenience of organization and treatment.
The classification adopted is not necessarily that discussed in any
of the cases co nomine, but the sense of the cases considered collec-
tively will support its use. It follows:
a. Retail mercantile businesses.
b. Wholesale mercantile businesses.
c. Manufacturing businesses.
d. Repair shops.
e. Restaurants and saloons.
t. Farmers.
g. Businesses in which only services are sold.
h. Miscellaneous.
Two further observations seem pertinent at this point. The cases
covered abound in language which suggests that at least a large num-
ber of them are controlled by rules of statutory construction, but upon
close examination it is clear that far from being controlling, the rules
of construction are of little import, serving in most instances only to
bolster up basic value judgments arrived at on other grounds. The
second point is that in many cases which are concerned with the prob-
lem of whether a particular statute is applicable to a particular busi-
ness, the result is clearly controlled by express statutory language not
common to most of the statutes.
a. Retai i ,m'ca tile businesses.
It has already been stated that bulk sales statutes derived their
principal impetus from the concerted efforts of Credit Men's Asso-
ciations. - The primary interest of the members of those Associations
was the protection of persons or firms who sold to the retail merchant
(n credit. Furthermore, most of the abuses sought to be remedied by
the statutes were perpetrated by retail merchants. Thus it was with
respect to secret sales of a retail stock that the alleged defect in the
law of fraudulent conveyances discussed above was most glaring. On
the basis of these extrinsic facts it is probable that the statutes, at
least in their early forms, were enacted for the primary purpose of
protecting the creditors of retail merchants.
It is clear from the cases that every statute enacted to date is appli-
cable to sales in bulk by retail merchants. Not only does a study of
the decided cases lead to that conclusion, 3 but a study of the language
32. Billig, .upra note 1, at 81-88.
33. Jubas v. Sampsell, 185 F.2d 333 (9th Cir. 1950); Woodruff v. Laugharn,
50 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1931); Sabin v. Horenstein, 260 Fed. 754 (9th Cir. 1919);Sproul v. Gambone, 43 F. Supp. 575 (W.D. Pa. 1942); Laugharn v. Zinmehman,
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of the statutes themselves compels the drawing of it. Such phrases as
"merchandise,"4 "goods, wares and merchandise,"3" "mercantile
28 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Cal. 1939); Terry v. McCall Co., 203 Ala. 141, 82 So. 171
(1919); Gretzinger v. Wynne Wholesale Grocer Co., 183 Ark, 303, 35 S.W.2d
604 (1931); North American Provision Co. v. Fischer Lime & Cement Co., 168
Ark. 106, 269 S.W. 993 (1925); Morris-Morton Drug Co. v. Glenwood Drug Co.,
127 Ark. 296, 192 S.W. 224 (1917) ; Stuart v. Elk Horn Bank and Trust Co., 123
Ark. 285, 185 S.W. 263 (1916) ; Walp v. Mooar, 76 Conn. 515, 57 Atl. 277 (1904) ;
Martin v. Taylor, 24 Ga. App. 598, 101 S.E. 690 (1919); Boise Assn. of Credit
Men v. Glenns F.M. Co., 48 Idaho 600, 283 Pac. 1038 (1930); Luthy & Co. v.
Paradis, 299 Ill. 380, 132 N.E. 556 (1921) ; Ogden Avenue State Bank v. Cherry,
225 Ill. App. 201 (1922); Wright v. Haley, 208 Ind. 46, 194 N.E. 637 (1935);
Hughes-Curry Packing Co. v. Sprague, 200 Ind. 540, 165 N.E. 318 (1929); Iowa
State Savings Bank of Malvern v. Young, 214 Iowa 1287 244 N.W. 271 (1932);
Hronik v. Warty, 205 Iowa 1111, 217 N.W. 449 (1928); Des Moines Packing Co.
v. Uncaphor, 174 Iowa 39, 156 N.W. 171 (1916); Richards-Conover Hardware
Co. v. Sharp, 150 Kan. 506, 95 P.2d 360 (1939); Lemen v. Leffringhouse, 127
Kan. 501, 274 Pac. 215 (1929); Holt v. Richardson & Tarbet, 116 Kan. 47, 225
Pac. 1086 (1924); Trego County State Bank v. Hillman, 104 Kan. 264, 178 Pac.
420 (1919) ; Burnett v. Trimmell, 103 Kan. 130, 173 Pac. 6 (1918) ; Gwinn Bros.
& Co. v. Peoples General Store, 269 Ky. 813, 108 S.W.2d 1001 (1937); Riedling
v. Ross and Zeitz, 213 Ky. 187, 280 S.W. 923 (1926); Tupper v. Barrett, 233
Mass. 565, 124 N.E. 427 (1919); Mills v. Sullivan, 222 Mass. 587, 111 N.E. 605
(1916); Adams v. Young, 200 Mass. 588, 86 N.E. 942 (1909); Kelly-Buckley Co.
v. Cohen, 195 Mass. 585, 81 N.E. 297 (1907); Gallus v. Elmer, 193 Mass. 106, 78
N.E. 772 (1906) ; Union Guardian Trust Co. v. Detroit Creamery Co., 265 Mich.
636, 251 N.W. 797 (1933); Hoja v. Motoc, 235 Mich. 258, 209 N.W. 66 (1926);
Gilbert v. Gonyea, 103 Minn. 459, 115 N.W. 640 (1908); Grant Motors, Inc. v.
Federal Credit Co., 183 Miss. 872, 185 So. 196 (1938); Cohen v. Calhoun, 168
Miss. 34, 150 So. 198 (1933) ; Whittington v. Yazoo Delta Mortgage Co., 148 Miss.
861, 114 So. 752 (1927); Moore Dry Goods Co. v. Rowe, 97 Miss. 775, 53 So. 626
(1910); Roberts v. Kaemmerer, 220 Mo. App. 582, 287 S.W. 1057 (1926); Cech
v. Costello, 117 Neb. 224, 220 N.W. 236 (1928); Niklans v. Lessenhop, 99 Neb.
803, 157 N.W. 1019 (1916); Appel Mercantile Co. v. Barker, 92 Neb. 669, 138
N.W. 1133 (1912); J. Goldman & Co. v. Crank, 200 N.C. 384, 156 S.E. 919 (1931);
Armfield Co. v. Saleeby, 178 N.C. 298, 100 S.E. 611 (1919); McMillen v. Nelson,
47 N.D. 284, 181 N.W. 618 (1921); Oregon Mill & Grain Co. v. Hyde, 87 Ore.
163, 169 Pac. 791 (1918) ; Rice v. West, 80 Ore. 640, 157 Pac. 1105 (1916) ; Oster-
well v. Crean, 344 Pa. 465, 26 A.2d 307 (1942) ; George H. West Shoe Co. v. Lem-
ish, 279 Pa. 414, 124 At]. 87 (1924); Smith v. Boyer, 119 S.C. 176, 112 S.E. 71
(1921) ; Cudahy Packing Co. v. Mylan, 56 S.D. 275, 228 N.W. 374 (1929) ; Larson
v. Becker, 47 S.D. 477, 199 N.W. 470 (1924) ; Keller v. Fowler Bros. & Cox, 148
Tenn. 571, 256 S.W. 879 (1923); Daly v. Sumpter Drug Co., 127 Tenn. 412, 155
S.W. 167 (1912); Slaughter v. Cooper Corporation, No. 2, 20 Tenn. App. 241. 97
S.W.2d 648 (1936); Henry King & Co. v. Arnett Bros., 7 Tenn. App. 410 (1928);
Butler Bros. v. Sinkin, 129 Tex. 331, 104 S.W.2d 14 (1937) ; Nash Hardware Co.
v. Morris, 105 Tex. 217, 146 S.W. 874 (1912) ; Texas Bank & Trust Co. v. Teich,
283 S.W. 552 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926); Blanchard Co. v. Ward, 124 Wash. 204,
213 Pac. 929 (1923); Continental Distributing Co. v. Swanson, 79 Wash. 128,
139 Pac. 865 (1914) ; Marlow v. Ringer, 79 W. Va. 568, 91 S.E. 386 (1917) ; State
Bank of Viroaua v. Jackson, 261 Wis. 538, 53 N.W.2d 433 (1952).
34. The following statutes have as their key phrase "a stock of merchandise."
ALA. CODE tit. 20, § 10 (Supp. 1952), ARK. STAT. ANN. § 68-1501 (1947); COLO.
STAT. ANN. c. 27, § 1 (Supp. 1952); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 6705 (1949); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 6, § 2101 (1953); ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 121%, § 78 (Supp. 1952); IND.
ANN. STAT. § 33-201 (Burns 1949); IOWA CODfE ANN. c. 555, § 555.1 (1950);
KAN. GEN. STAT. § 58-101 (1949); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2961 (1950); ME.
REV. STAT. e. 106, § 6 (1944); MASS. ANN. LAWS. c. 106, § 1 (1947); MIoH. STAT.
ANN. § 19.361 (1937); MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 513.18 (West 1947); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 274 (1942); Mo. REV. STAT. § 427.020 (Vernon 1950); NEB. REV. STAT.§ 36-501 (1952); NEv. Comp. LAWS § 6816 (Supp. 1949); N.H. REV. LAWS c. 262,
§ 43 (1942); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:29-1 (1940); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-1001
(1941); N.Y. PERs. PROP. LAW § 44; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-23 (1950); N.D. REV.
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business,"-' "stock in trade," : "person in the business of buying com-
modities and selling the same in small quantities, for purposes of
profit,"" recur in the statutes. The only problem presenting any
difficulty is whether any business other than a retail mercantile busi-
ness falls within the statutes. It would appear that only the Arizona
statute " is so narrowly drafted as to lead to the conclusion that only
retail merchants are included. That statute applies only to "person [s]
in the business of buying commodities and selling the same in small
quantities. . . ." Interestingly enough, however, in Nolte v. Win-
stanley,"' without any discussion of the problem posed by the statutory
language, the Supreme Court of Arizona held that the sale of a bakery
and confectionary business was within the Arizona bulk sales statute,
except the fixtures, wagons, teams and implements of manufacture
used in the trade and not daily exposed to sale. Thus, a business in
which labor in a substantial quantity is added to raw materials in
order to convert them into salable form is within the purview of the
statute at least to the extent of the finished products if they are offered
for sale at retail.
An earlier Connecticut statute" contained the same language pres-
ently found only in the Arizona statute. The Supreme Court of Errors
of Connecticut held in a case arising under that statute that a stone-
cutting business did not fall within its purview,12 but the decision was
rested on two grounds, one of which was not present in the Nolte case.
The facts were these. The business consisted of purchasing stone
slabs which were cut into smaller pieces, tooled, dressed and polished.
In most instances they were prepared to fill special orders (the factor
not present in the Nolte case) but occasionally the finished products
were completed without special order and sold without the addition
of further labor. The court said that neither an exclusively manu-
facturing nor an exclusively wholesale business came within the
statute, but that where the end products are in part at least sold at
CODE 4 51-0202 (1943); Onyo GEN. CODE ANN. § 11102 (1938); R.I. GEN. LAWS
c. 483, § 1 (1938); S.D. CODE § 54.0301 (1939) ; TENN. CODE ANN. § 7283 (Williams
1934); Tnx. Rnv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4001 (1945); VT. REV. STAT. § 7846 (1947);
VA,. CODE § 55-83 (1950); Wyo. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 41-701 (1945).
35. D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-1701 (1951); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 726.02 (1944); GA.
CODE ANN. 4 28-203 (1952); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 64-701 (1948); MD. ANN. CODE
Gwi. LAws art. 83, § 97 (1951); MONT. RoV. Coms ANN. § 18-201 (1947); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 71 (1937); Ore. Laws 1949, c. 435 § 1; PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
69, § 521 (1931); UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-2-1 (1953); WASH. REy. CODE § 63.08.010(1952); W.VA. CODE ANN. § 4001 (1949); Wis. STAT. § 241.18 (1951).
36. S.C. CODE § 11-201 (1952).
37. CAL. Civ. CODE § 3440.1 (Supp. 1953).
38. Arnz. Coot ANN. § 58-301 (1939).
39. ibid.
40. 16 Ariz. 327, 145 Pac. 246 (1914).
41. Conn. Laws 1909, c. 21.
42. Connecticut Steam Brown Stone Co. v. Lewis, 86 Conn. 386, 85 AtI. 534
(1912).
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retail, a case by case determination must be made in order to discover
whether the particular business falls within the statute. Here the
court found that the sales at retail of products finished without special
order were relatively few, that because of the great difference between
the unfinished slab and the finished product, labor and not material
was the most important ingredient of the product being sold, and
consequently that the people engaged in the business were not making
it their business "to buy commodities and sell the same in small quanti-
ties." The two cases are clearly distinguishable on their facts, and
it is not at all certain that the Connecticut court would have disa-
greed in result with the Arizona court had a bakery, selling its output
at retail and not filling special orders almost exclusively, been involved.
It appears to the writer that the clear language of the statute com-
pels a different conclusion. The key words are "of buying commodities
and selling the same" (Italics added). In cases where a substantial
part of the commodity sold at retail is labor, especially labor other
than that normally involved in the mere distribution and marketing
of goods, the "same" commodity is not being sold as was originally
purchased by the owner of the business. Consequently those businesses
in which more is done than merely breaking packages or otherwise
changing the size or quantity to suit the needs of customers, which is
certainly the situation when either a stone-cutter or baker is involved,
should be held to fall outside the scope of a statute like that of Ari-
zona.4 3 In any event it is apparent that a "liberal-in-fact" interpreta-
tion has been given in these cases, although neither court has ever
announced a rule of construction in a bulk sales case.
Conversely, a few cases decided under statutes much less restrictive
in their terms than the Arizona statute contain language which could
be interpreted as meaning that those statutes apply exclusively to
retail merchants. That language takes two principal forms: (1) a
statement that the purpose of the bulk sales statute is ". . . to protect
creditors of retail merchants against fraudulent sales by the debtors
43. See also, The Farmers & Drovers National Bank v. Hannaman, 11$ Kan.
370, 223 Pac. 478 (1924) (restaurant not within act because goods not in same
form when sold); Swift & Co. v. Tempelos, 178 N.C. 487, 101 S.E. 8 (1919)(statute contemplates a "stock of goods which has been bought for resale in a
substantially unchanged condition.") See also, Bolanovich v. Peter Hauptmann
Tobacco Co., 261 S.W. 723 (Mo. App. 1924), holding a restaurant not to fallwithin the statute and distinguishing a saloon in that in the latter type of
business many articles are resold without any change in forn. The court said:
The statute was evidently intended to apply to a stock of merchandise and
equipment used in connection with the business, where the merchandise is
bought for resale in substantially the same form that it is originally bought,
and does not apply to a restaurant keeper's business, where he or she does
not undertake to resell the articles in the form purchased.
Id. at 724.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1954/iss1/5
BULK SALES
of their stocks and merchandise. ' '14 It should be noted, however, that
while the statement may be true in the abstract, the statutory lan-
guage does not demand such a restricted interpretation; in fact it
seems to indicate a broader one.4 5 Beyond that, the statement is only
dictum since there was no dispute in the case as to the fact that the
business considered was a retail business. The other language (2) is
that:
... [T] he class of vendors embraced in the statutory provision are
those whose business is the sale of stock or merchandise to intend-
ing customers who resort to the place where such stock or mer-
chandise is kept for sale to such persons .4
It may be argued that retailers do not usually resort to the wholesale
warehouse to purchase goods, and consequently that wholesalers are
not covered. Such a construction seems strained, however, since in
many instances ordering from the corner grocery store is done by
telephone without prior inspection of the goods. Since in the case what
was sold was a fleet of buses, the business was clearly one which regu-
larly sold services only, and the possible construction suggested above
was not in any sense necessary to the decision. 47
It is clear that retail merchants are within the scope of every statute
enacted thus far, and, further, that there are no specific holdings that
any statute is confined to retail merchants." However, the interpreta-
tion placed on the Arizona statute by its Supreme Court and that
placed on the early Connecticut statute of the same type appear to be
erroneous as a matter of statutory interpretation.
44. Hronik v. Warty, 205 Iowa 1111, 1114, 217 N.W. 449, 451 (1928); see
also, Lewis, Hubbard & Co. v. Loughran, 85 W. Va. 235, 101 S.E. 465 (1919).
45. IowA ComE ANN. C. 555, § 555.1 (1950) provides in part: "The sale ... of
any part ... of a stock of merchandise and the fixtures pertaining to the conduct-
ing of said business.., shall be void .... " It is true, however, that the original
Iowa statute (Iowa Acts 1911, c. 150, § 1) expressly covered both retail and
wholesale businesses, and the conclusion may be drawn that the change in the
wording justifies the inference that the legislature no longer intended that
wholesalers should be covered. For the view that the inclusiveness of the statutory
language will probably override the failure to continue the express inclusion
during the amending process, see Note, 20 IowA L. RBv. 815, 823 (1935).
46. VanGenderen v. Arrow Bus Lines, Inc., 107 N.J. Eq. 217, 219, 151 AtI. 605,
606 (Ct. Err. & App. 1930).
47. The language quoted above was relied on in Samuelson v. Goldberg, 13 N.J.
Misc. 204, 177 At). 260 (Sup. Ct. 1935), but the decision in that case was simply
that a poultry farmer did not fall within the statute.
48. In State Bank of Viroqua v. Jackson, 261 Wis. 538, 53 N.W.2d 433 (1952),
the court stated that the earlier case of Missos v. Spyros, 182 Wis. 631, 197 N.W.
196 (1924), held ". . . that the law applies only to merchants selling at retail
and to the property held for sale at retail, and it does not apply to items that
are to be processed or to which labor is to be added prior to sale." Id. at 541, 197
N.W. at 435. It should be pointed out that a wholesaler processes and adds labor
to no greater extent than a retailer.
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b. Wholesale mercantile businesses.
Only in North. American Provision Co. v. Fischer Lime and Cement
Co. 9 has a court had squarely before it the problem of whether an
exclusively wholesale mercantile establishment, with no elements of
manufacturing involved, is covered by the putatively applicable bulk
sales statute. In that case the Supreme Court of Arkansas, speaking
through Mr. Justice Hart, said -
It has been said that the practice of retail merchants in selling
their stocks in bulk are [sic] the most common source of fraud
with which the courts have to deal, and that such statutes were
passed for the protection of wholesale merchants. A sufficient an-
swer to this is that wholesale merchants, by selling their stocks in
bulk, could practice a fraud upon manufacturers and other whole-
sale merchants, who are their creditors, just as successfully as
retail merchants could do in the sale of their stocks in bulk. After
all, the language of the statute must be the test as to what class of
merchants are [sic] embraced within its scope.60
While the "sufficiency" of that "answer" is open to some question,
particularly because of the usual discrepancy in size and capitalization
between most retailers and most wholesalers, nevertheless it seems to
reflect the attitude of nearly all of the courts which have made any
reference to the problem.In other cases the problem has been discussed, although the precise
point was not in issue. It has been stated,51 for example, that the
existence of charter authority to engage in both retail and wholesale
business was immaterial in determining the applicability of the
Nebraska bulk sales statute.5 - Likewise, dicta may be found in two
cases decided by the Supreme Court of Texas that the Texas statute
covers both wholesalers and retailers."
In addition, the failure in three cases to state, as a ground for hold-
ing particular transfers outside the applicable statute, that the whole-
sale aspects of a business are not covered by bulk sales statutes, lends
support to the view that they are covered.54 In all of the three cases,
49. 168 Ark. 106, 269 S.W. 993 (1925); of. Benedict & Eberle Co. v. Hollman,
68 Pa. Super. 155, 158 (1917).
50. North American Provision Co. v. Fischer Lime & Cement Co., 168 Ark. at
110, 111, 269 S.W. at 994. See also, Gretzinger v. Wynne Wholesale Grocer Co.,
183 Ark. 303, 35 S.W.2d 604 (1931); Root Refineries v. Gay Oil Co., 171 Ark.
129, 284 S.W. 26 (1926).
51. Nildaus v. Lessenhop, 99 Neb. 803, 157 N.W. 1019 (1916).
52. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 36-501 to 36-502 (1952). It should be noted, however,
that the language of the Nebraska statute is such that a business in which no
stock of merchandise is maintained is covered since the 1941 amendment, so it
is clear that the wholesaler would certainly be included.
53. Butler Bros. v. Sinkin, 129 Tex. 331, 333, 104 S.W.2d 14, 15 (1937) ; Nash
Hardware Co. v. Morris, 105 Tex. 217, 223, 146 S.W. 874, 876 (1912). See also,
Luthy & Co. v. Paradis, 299 Ill. 380, 132 N.E. 556 (1921).
54. Sabin v. Horenstein, 260 Fed. 754 (9th Cir. 1919); Osterweil v. Crean,
344 Pa. 465, 26 A.2d 307 (1942); Keller v. Fowler Bros. & Cox, 148 Tenn. 571,
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the seller sold at both retail and wholesale; in one of them the seller
owned a chain of retail grocery stores and a wholesale house or depot
which was used to supply the retail outlets. The stock in the wholesale
house was sold without compliance with the Tennessee bulk sales
statute.,' The court held that the transfer fell within the statute. In
the other two cases, the sellers were doing both a retail and jobbing
business in men's furnishings. In one of them,57 stocks were purchased
in job lots for a sale at retail and as many retail sales as possible were
made within a short period. The remainder of the lot was then dis-
posed of as a job lot to auction houses. The transfer attacked was one
in which a job lot had been purchased and then resold as a job lot
without any attempt to sell any part of it at retail. In the other case' 8
the report is less detailed but it appears that while usually the seller
sold both in job lots and at retail, the transfers attacked were job lot
sales of greater quantity and frequency than the usual ones. In both
cases the transfers were held to be outside the operation of the bulk
sales laws, not on the ground that wholesalers were not covered, but
rather on the ground that the particular transfers were not "out of
the ordinary course of trade."
It may be argued, of course, that since the sellers were combined
retailers and wholesalers, the cases lend no support to the thesis that
wholesalers fall within the statutes. It is true that in clothing cases
it would have been difficult to separate the retail from the wholesale
elements of the businesses, but that difficulty did not exist in the
Keller case.: ' While the paucity of cases, the 'atfiones decidendae of
which relate to the problem at hand, makes the task of making flat
statements a hazardous one, confidence may be bolstered by a reading
of the statutory language itself, for the language of all statutes except
that of Arizona is clearly broad enough to cover wholesalers as well as
retailers, although only the Florida and California statuteseo expressly
apply to wholesalers as well as retailers. In any event, it is certain
that with respect to the problem under consideration here, the statutes
have not received the strict interpretation which most writers have
asserted has been given to bulk sales statutes but have rather received
a "liberal-in-fact" interpretation.
256 S.W. 880 (1923). See also, Carpenter v. Karnow, 193 Fed. 762 (D.C. Mass.
1911); Martin v. Taylor, 24 Ga. App. 598, 101 S.E. 690 (1919).
55. Keller v. Fowler Bros. & Cox, 148 Tenn. 571, ?56 S.W. 879 (1923).
56. TENN. CoE ANN. 1§ 7283-7285 (Williams, 1934).
57. Osterweil v. Crean, 344 Pa. 465, 26 A.2d 307 (1942).
58. Sabin v. Horenstein, 260 Fed. 754 (9th Cir. 1919).
59. Keller v. Fowler Bros. & Cox, 148 Tenn. 571, 256 S.W. 879 (1923).
60. CAL. Crv. CoDE * 3440.1 (Supp. 1953); FIA. STAT. ANN. § 726.02 (1944);
reference should again be made, however, to NLs. Rv. STAT. § 36-501 (1952)
mentioned in note 52, supra.
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c. Manufacturing businesses.
Although many statements may be found in the cases which suggest
generally that manufacturing businesses do not fall within the pur-
view of bulk sales statutes," analysis reveals that the decisions are not
unanimous,62 and further that in some cases holding a particular
manufacuturer to fall outside the statute in question, the decision is
carefully guarded.6 3 Of great significance are the fact that several
distinctions have been suggested, though not often used as a basis for
decision, and the fact that certain other distinctions may be inferred
from language contained in other cases.
Since this is a problem in statutory construction, the question of
what approach has been taken should be first examined. From that
point of view the cases fall into two groups. In one of them the issue
is expressed in terms of seeking legislative intention, while the other
group proceeds more directly to a decision on the specific issue without
reference to legislative intention. Those expressly seeking legislative
intention may be further subdivided. One sub-group approaches the
problem with something like a combination of the plain-meaning rule
and rules requiring strict construction of penal statutes and statuted
in derogation of the common law.64 The resUlt there is almost invari-
61. Shasta Lumber Co. v. McCoy, 85 Cal. App. 468 (1927); Atlas Rock Co; v.
Miami Beach Builders Supply Co., 89 Fla. 340, 103 So. 615 (1925); Cooney,
Eckstein & Co. v. Sweat, 133 Ga. 511, 66 S.E. 257 (1909); Frederick v. Dettary
Engineering Co., 318 Mich. 252, 28 N.W.2d 94 (1947); Spurr v. Travis 145
Mich. 721, 108 N.W. 1090 (1906); Lee v. Gillen & Boney, 90 Neb. 730, 134 W.
278 (1912); Broad Street National Bank v. Lit Bros., 306 Pa. 85, 158 AtI. 866(1932) ; Gitt v. Hoke, 301 Pa. 31, 151 At. 585 (1930) ; Brockway Machine Bottle
Co.. v. Monaca Glass Co., 118 Pa. Super. 347, 179 At]. 818 .(1935); Bechman
v. Hershey Creamery Co., 30 Dauph. 371 (1927) [contra, Baker v. Young, 17
Pa. D.&C. 9 (1931) ]; Neas v. Borches, 109 Tenn. 398, 71 S.W. 50 (1902); Lewis
Brown Co. v. Mallory, 8 Tenn. App. 36 (1928); Bozeman v. Naff, 5 Tenn. App.
77 (1927); of. Schultz, Baujan & Co. v. Bell, 23 Tenn. App. 258, 180 S.W.2d 149(1939), where the court indicated that if finished products of a bakery had been
sold the transaction would fall within the statute. Tomforde v. Mitchell Const.
Co., 91 S.W.2d 1137 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936); American Surety Co. of New York
v. M-B Ise Kream Co.,'38 S.W.2d 118 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931); Industrial Accep-
tance Corporation v. Corey, 19 S.W.2d 365 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929); Grimesyv.
Huntsville State Bank, 12 S.W.2d 1087 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928); Hobart Mfg. Co.
v. Joyce & Mitchell, 4 S.W.2d 185 (Tex. Civ App. 1928). Contra, Teich v.
McAuley, 212 S.W. 979 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919).. See, 34 VA. L. REv. 96 (1948).
62. In Te United Traveling Goods Co., 297 Fed. 823 (2d Cir. 1924); Gretzinger
v. Wynne Wholesale Grocer Co., 183 Ark. 303, 35 S.W.2d 604 (1931); Root Re-
fineries v. Gay Oil Co., 171 Ark. 129, 284 S.W. 26 (1926); Kranke v. American
Fabrics Co., 112 Conn. 58, 151 Atl. 312 (1930) (interpreting the New Jersey bulk
sales law). The Kr'ronke case was repudiated by the New Jersey Supreme Court
in Samuelson v. Goldberg, 13 N.J. Misc. 204, 177 At. 260 (Sup. Ct. 1935) ; G.S.
Johnson Co. v. Beloosky, 263 Ill. 363, 105 N.E. 287 (1914) (under the very broadly
worded Illinois statute); Kennedy v. Dillon, 97 N.H. 76, 80 A.2d 394 (1951);
Mosson v. Kriser, 212 App. Div. 282, 208 N.Y. Supp. 566 (1st Dep't 1925); of.
Hart v. Brierley, 189 Mass. 598, 76 N.E. 286 (1905).
63. In re Saraw, 91 F.2d 957 (2d Cir. 1937); Ramey-Milburn Co. v. Sevick,
159' Ark. 358, 252 S.W. 20 (1923).
64. Atlas Rock Co. v. Miami Beach Builders Supply Co., 89 Fla 340 103 So. 615(1925) (coverage will be strictly limited to that indicated in the title) ; Cooney,
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ably a holding that the particular statute does not cover manufac-
turers. The approach used by the second sub-group is to look to the
moving force behind the bulk sales statutes, the defect sought to be
cured by the legislation, and so to construe and resolve in the light of
whatever legislative purpose is disclosed thereby. Here too, the result
is that manufacturers are held not to be covered because the evils
aimed at were the sins of retailers and the statutes were the result of
concerted activity on the part of retail credit men's associations.0'
The second major grouping is of those cases which pass over what
might be called the preliminary problem, (i.e., legislative intent seek-
ing) and proceed directly to a decision on the ultimate issue. It is in
that group of cases that we find some decisions indicating that under
some circumstances a manufacturer might be covered.
Two of the earliest cases which dealt with the problem, even in pass-
ing, assumed that the particular statute would not cover manufactur-
ers and so stated1 Both cases were principally concerned with the
question of the constitutionality of the statute, it having been attacked
as class legislation. The contentions were that by excluding manufac-
turers and others from its coverage the classification was unreason-
able. That reasoning convinced the Supreme Court of Illinois, and as
a result the first Illinois bulk sales statute' was held invalid.,8 In
Spurr v,. Travis,6 however, the same reasoning was rejected by the
Supreme Court of Mlichigan which thought that a classification which
excluded manufacturers was entirely reasonable and so upheld the
Michigan statute.
The Illinois legislature passed another statute70 in very broad form"'
Eckstein & Co. v. Sweat, 133 Ga. 511, 66 S.E. 257 (1909) (derogation rule); Gitt
v. Hoke, 301 Pa. 31, 151 Atl. 585 (1930) (combination of derogation rule, rule
that penal statutes must be strictly construed and plain-meaning rule); Nichols,
North Buse Co. v. Belgium Cannery, 188 Wis. 115, 205 N.W. 804 (1925) (deroga-
tion rule and rule that penal statutes must be strictly construed).
65. Cooney, Eckstein & Co. v. Sweat, 133 Ga. 511, 66 S.E. 257 (1909); Gitt
v. Hoke, 301 Pa. 31, 151 Ati. 585 (1930). What is perhaps a variation of this
uane idea is found in Frederick v. Dettary Engineering Co., 318 Mich. 252, 28
N.W.2d 94 (1947), in which the Court says:
It is well known that the business of retailing goods, wares, and merchan-
dise is conducted largely upon credit, and furnishes an opportunity for the
commission of frauds upon creditors not usual in other cases of business.
Id. at 255, 28 N.W.2d at 95, quoting from Spurr v. Travis, 145 Mich. 721, 108
N.W. 1090 (1906) which in turn quoted from McDaniels v. J.J. Connelly Shoe
Co., 30 Wash. 549, 71 Pac. 37 (1902).
66. Charles J. Off & Co. v. Morehead, 235 Ill. 40, 85 N.E. 264 (1908); Spurr
v. Travis, 145 Mich. 721, 108 N.W. 1090 (1906).
67. Ill. Laws 1905, p. 284.
68. Charles J. Off & Co. v. Morehead, 235 IlL 40, 85 N.E. 264 (1908).
69. 145 Mich. 721, 108 N.W. 1090 (1906).
70. Ill. Laws 1913, p. 258.
71. The statutes of several states are so worded that manufacturers could
easily be held to be covered, and in some instances should be so held. E.g., CAL.
Civ. Con § 3440.1 (Supp. 1953) includes "... the sale .. .of the fixtures or
store equipment of a ... machinist... ." IDAHO CoDE ANN. § 64-701 (1948)
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which the Supreme Court of Illinois has since construed to cover manu-
facturers on the specific ground that it was drafted in the light of the
Court's decision in Charles J. Off & Co. v. Morehead.7 2 The original
holding of the Michigan Supreme Court on the other hand was recently
affirmed in Frederick v. Dettary Engineering Co.,73 the Court taking
the position that while it always construes the statute liberally, any
further extension will have to come from the legislature. Of those
courts which have made an approach characterized by the application
of the usual canons or rules of construction to the statute, only the
Illinois Supreme Court has held that manufacturers are included and
the statement holds whether the aids used have been intrinsic or ex-
trinsic, and whether the court otherwise has a rule of strict or liberal
construction nominally applicable to problems arising under bulk sales
statutes.",
On the other hand, those courts which have made a direct approach
to the problem have reached varying conclusions. Some of the courts
which have considered the problem have ruled that manufacturers are
not covered by the statutes, and have done so in broad terms without
differentiating between various parts of a manufacturing business, i.e.,
whether raw materials, machinery, fixtures, equipment or finished
products were included in the sale under attack when not all of them
covers the sale of "... any portion of the property, furniture, fixtures, or
equipment or supplies . .. [of] any place of business wherein the furniture,
fixtures, or equipment are used in carrying on said business.. . "LA. Rev. STAT.
ANN. 1 9:2961 (1950) demands compliance in the case of "The transfer ... of
all or substantially all of the fixtures or equipment used or to be used in the
display, imanufacture, care, or delivery of any goods, wares, or merchandise in-
cluding movable store and office fixtures, horses, wagons, automobile trucks and
other vehicles or other goods or chattels of the business of the tranferor ... "
NEB. REV. STAT. § 36-501 (1952) applies to "... the sale ... of any part ... of a
stock of fixtures, equipment or machinery by any person, firm or corporation en-
gaged in a business in which no stock of merchandise is maintained .... " Ore.
Laws 1949 c. 435, § 1 covers the purchase of ". .. the goods, wares and merchan-
dise in bulk of any commercial business or establishment, including restaurants
and other food dispensing establishments, or of all, or substantially all, of the
furniture, fixtures, supplies, or equipment of any such business or establishment,
including motor vehicles...." UTAH COna AIn. 5 25-2-1 (1953) covers the ".
purchase... [of] any portion of the property, furniture, fixtures, equipment or
supplies of a hotel, restaurant, barbershop or other bsiness ... " (Italics added.)
It is true that in the latter situation the ejudem genrs rule might be invoked
with the result that only businesses in which the sale of services predominates are
included, however.
It is certainly true, however, that each of the other statutes should be construed
to cover manufacturers, with the possible exception of the Oregon statute.
72. G. S. Johnson Co. v. Beloosky, 263 Ill. 363, 105 N.E. 287 (1914). And see
Landers Frary & Clark v. Vischer Products Co., 201 F.2d 319 (7th Cir. 1953).
73. 318 Mich. 252, 28 N.W.2d 94 (1947).
74. Atlas Rock Co. v. Miami Beach Builders Supply Co., 89 Fla. 340, 103 So.
615 (1925); Cooney, Eckstein & Co. v. Sweat, 133 Ga. 511, 66 S.E. 257 (1909);
Frederick v. Dettary Engineering Co., 318 Mich. 252, 28 N.W.2d 94 (1947) ; Gitt v.
Hoke, 301 Pa. 31, 151 AtI. 585 (1930); Nichols, North, Buse Co. v. Belgium Can-
nery, 188 Wis. 115, 205 N.W. 804 (1925).
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were involved in the disputed transaction.7 - A few courts, however,
have been less certain that manufacturing businesses in all of their
aspects are excluded, although the transaction in the particular case
under consideration was held to fall outside the scope of the statute.71
In the case of In re Saraw 71 the owner of a plant in which cider was
processed into vinegar while stored in vats, gave a chattel mortgage on
the cider in the vats. It was contended that the mortgage was void be-
cause of non-compliance with the New York bulk mortgages statute,'7
which the court construed to be in pari materia with the bulk sales
law. " Although the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
held the statute inapplicable to the transaction in question, they stated:
None of the cases seems to us to require that the statute should
be construed to apply to a manufacturer who sells only to the
wholesale trade and in ordinary course of business places a mort-
gage upon a part of the raw materials he has acquired for the
purpose of manufacturing his final product. Such materials are
not held by him for sale and are not properly described as "a
stock of merchandise." We cannot believe that the Legislature
would have used such inappropriate language had it intended to
require that notice be given to all a manufacturer's creditors be-
fore he could place a valid mortgage on any part of his raw mate-
rials. If he were selling out his business or mortgaging everything
in the plant, the transaction would be within the spirit and pur-
/lose of the bulk sales statutes and might . ..be construed to be
within the phrase "merchandise and fixtures pertaining to the
,ronduct of the business." While the case is not quite so clear as to
a niortgage upon part of a manufacturer's finished product, we
heliere the saone conclusion should also be reached as to such a
mortgage. (Italics added.),*
In so holding the federal court distinguished three previous cases
on the ground that in all of them some things which could fairly be
called merchandise were included in the mortgages or sales. In one of
them, the Appellate Division found the sale of a woodworking busi-
ness ". . . together with the goods, wares, merchandise, fixtures and
machinery thereof . . ." to fall within the bulk sales statute on the
ground that "... there is nothing in such business which would be
75. Spurr v. Travis, 145 Mich. 721, 108 N.W. 1090 (1906); Lee v. Gillen &
Boney, 90 Neb. 730, 134 N.W. 278 (1912); Broad Street National Bank v. Lit
Bros., 306 Pa. 85, 158 Atl. 866 (1932); Lewis Brown Co. v. Mallory, 8 Tenn. App.36 (1928), cf. Schultz, Baujan & Co. v. Bell, 23 Tenn. App. 258, 130 S.W.2d 149(1939); Tomforde v. Mitchell Const. Co., 91 S.W.2d 1137 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936);
American Surety Co. of New York v. M-B Ise Kream Co., 38 S.W.2d 118 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1931); Grimes v. Huntsville State Bank, 12 S.W.2d 1087 (Tex. Civ. App.
1928).
76. In re Saraw, 91 F.2d 957 (2d Cir. 1937) ; Ramey-Milburn Co. v. Sevick, 159
Ark, 358, 252 S.W. 20 (19a3) ; Schultz, Bauian & Co. v. Bell, 23 Tenn. App. 258,
130 S.W.2d 149 (1939).
77. 91 F.2d 957 (2d Cir. 1937).
78. N.Y. LmuN LAw, § 230a.
79. N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW, § 44.
80. 91 F.2d 957, 959, 960 (2d Cir. 1937).
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inconsistent with the defendant's carrying a stock of merchandise and
selling and disposing of the same in connection with its business."' '
The court went on to illustrate its position by saying:
Indeed, it is difficult to understand how anyone engaged in the
business of woodworking and cabinet work would not manufac-
ture goods for sale, either at retail or wholesale and it is quite
reasonable to assume that when engaged in such business a stock
of goods was accumulated which it afterwards disposed of to
customers in the usual course of business. It seems to me that the
situation is quite like that of the shoe manufacturer who pur-
chases a large amount of leather and raw material from which
shoes are made which are afterwards disposed of as merchandise.
Take the case of the Aeolian Company ... They purchase large
quantities of high-grade lumber for the manufacture of sounding
boards and other parts to musical instruments, which are sold and
disposed of to the public. If the Aeolian Company should sell its
business in bulk, not only its fixtures but its stock of manufac-
tured articles, could it be said that they would not be within the
provisions of [the bulk sales law] . . .?1082
In another of the three cases, In re United Traveling Goods Co.,83
the Circuit Court of Appeals for the same circuit had held that while
a mortgage which was intended to cover only the machinery, fixtures,
and chattels of one engaged in the manufacture of traveling goods
would fall outside the scope of the bulk mortgages law, one which
was intended to cover the stock of goods and merchandise as well
would be included thereunder.
The third case, In re Laureate Co., 84 can be distinguished much less
readily than the other two. The mortgagor in that case was engaged
in the business of advertising novelties, printing folding boxes and
selling calendars. He purchased a stock of 130,000 pictures to attach
to calendars which he proposed to sell. Before any of the pictures were
attached to the calendars, he gave a chattel mortgage on his job presses
as well as on all goods and chattels appearing in a certain schedule.
Although the court did not expressly exclude the possibility that some
of the scheduled items may have been merchandise in the full sense
of the word, nevertheless the fact that the court seized on the 130,000
calendars as the merchandise which brought the transaction under the
statute indicates that there were no items included which were ready
for sale without some further added labor. Although the process of
purchasing pictures and attaching them to calendars may seem to bear
little similarity to the processes used in a typical manufactory, never-
theless, it is arguable that the pictures are analogous to the raw mate-
81. Mosson v. Kriser, 212 App. Div. 282, 284, 285, 208 N.Y. Supp. 566, 569 (1st
Dep't 1925).
82. I& at 285, 208 N.Y. Supp. at 569.
83. 297 Fed. 823 (2d Cir. 1924).
84. 294 Fed. 668 (2d Cir. 1923).
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rial used in many businesses which are clearly assembly plants. More-
over, the dissimilarity between the process of attaching pictures to
calendars and the process of placing cider in a vat and letting it, by
the process of fermentation, become vinegar is not such a great one.
It must be admitted, however, that the court in the Saraw case was
fully justified in accepting the characterization of the pictures as
merchandise. .;
From these cases it would seem that we may safely conclude that
in New York, a manufacturing business falls within the bulk sales and
bulk mortgages statutes, and the only problem is whether the statute
has been violated, i.e., has merchandise (which the court has construed
to mean finished products in the case of a manufacturing business),
been included in the mortgage or sale? Yet in 1942 in Matter of Sun-
shine Stores the Appellate Division held that the bulk mortgages law
is not applicable to a mortgage on ". . . various items of equipment,
logs and lumber and manufactured products of the logs . . ." belong-
ing to the owner or lessee of a sawmill, relying on In re Saraw8T and
the Georgia case of Cooney, Eckstein & Co. v. Sweat." The case can be
distinguished from the other cases decided under the New York stat-
utes, and it is significant that those cases were not cited at all in the
Sunshine Stores decision. The basis for distinction is that in the
Sunohine Stores case there was nothing to indicate that the seller
resembled in any way the ordinary merchant who sells his products
normally at wholesale or retail as do many other businessmen who do
not manufacture their own inventory. Thus the seller did not sell
merchandise as that term has been interpreted in the New York cases.
In 1934, however, the New York bulk sales statute was amended to
cover the transfer of ". . . any part or the whole of a stock of mer-
chandise or of fixtures, or merchandise and of fixtures . . . ,"81 al-
though the bulk mortgages statute remains in its original form. It is
clear that under the present bulk sales statute, a transfer may be in-
cluded even though no merchandise is sold, but that for a mortgage
to fall within the scope of the bulk mortgages statute, some merchan-
dise must be included."" Because there is some indication in lower
85. See also DiGregorio v. Avanti Publishing Co., 129 Misc. 345, 221 N.Y.
Supp. 497 (Sup. Ct. 1927) (printing business within if a stock of its manu-
factured products is maintained). In Mott v. Reeves, 125 Misc. 511, 211 N.Y.
Supp. 375 (Sup. Ct. 1925), aff'd mem., 217 App. Div. 718, 215 N.Y. Supp. 889(4th Dep't 1926), aff'd mem., 246 N.Y. 567, 159 N.E. 654 (1927), it was recognized
by way of dictum that the raw materials of a manufacturer are not merchandise
within the act.
86. Matter of Sunshine Stores, Inc., 264 App. Div. 930, 36 N.Y.S.2d 2 (3d Dep'Vt
1942).
87. 91 F.2d 957 (2d Cir. 1937).
88. 133 Ga. 511, 66 S.E. 257 (1909).
89. N.Y. PEas. PRop. LAw § 44.
90. Atamian v. O'Leary, 154 Misc. 757, 278 N.Y. Supp. 218 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
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court decisions in New York that this change means not only that the
sale of the fixtures alone of a merchandising business are included, but
also that the sale of fixtures of businesses which have no merchandise
are covered91 the value of the earlier New York precedents in con-
struing the bulk sales statute is in doubt, though, of course they retain
their vitality as interpretations which control the application of the
bulk mortgages statute2
Another line of authority takes the position that a manufacturing
business is not covered by bulk sales statutes unless the usual and
ordinary disposition of the finished products is not merely "incidental
to the business of manufacturing." This position has been taken by
the Supreme Court of Arkansas in a line of cases beginning with
Ramey-Milburn Co. v. Sevick,9  decided in 1923. The seller sold a
manufacturing business consisting of several saw-mills and a veneer
mill. Included in the sale were logs and lumber which the court found
to be of small value when compared with the aggregate value of all the
property conveyed. The court held that the sale did not fall within
the statute because, the sale of the product of the manufactory was
merely incidental to the manufacturing business, the purpose of the
bulk sales statute being only to regulate bulk sales of merchandise
which are part of a stock of a mercantile establishment.-
Three years later the same court held that the sale of an oil refining
business fell within the statute on the ground that under the facts, the
sale was not merely incidental to the manufacture of the refined oil
products because, like all other merchants, the bulk seller had sold
the output from day to day.94 Similarly in Gretzinger v. Wynne Whole-
sale Grocer Co./9 the court held that the sale of a retail and wholesale
bakery, which from the nature of the business could not have included
any substantial amount of finished products, fell within the bulk sales
statute because:
. . . [E]verything except the fixtures was not only for sale, but
was sold every day and was constantly going out of the store or
bakery and was being replaced by other goods. The principal busi-
ness of the bakery was selling bread, cakes, cookies, pastries, etc.
91. This trend in the decisions appears first in Davignon v. Racquette River
Paper Co., 269 App. Div. 889, 56 N.Y.S.2d 249 (3d Dep't 1945), appeal dismissed
295N.Y. 569, 64 N.E.2d 279 (1945), where the word "merchandise" was given
an extremely broad definition. Then in Flushing National Bank in New York v.
Abrams, 270 App. Div. 911, 61 N.Y.S.2d 609 (2d Dep't 1946), aff'd mom., 296 N.Y.
1009, 73 N.E.2d 582 (1947), a dry-cleaning establishment was held to fall within
the statute. Finally in Stumpp & Walter Co. v. Napanoch Country Club, Inc., 198
Misc. 600, 102 N.Y.S.2d 489 (Sup. Ct 1950), there was a clear statement that the
1934 amendment indicated an intention to extend the scope of the statute to other
businesses.
92. Atamian v. O'Leary, 154 Misc. 757, 278 N.Y. Supp. 218 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
93. 159 Ark. 358, 252 S.W. 20 (1923).
94. Root Refineries v. Gay Oil Co., 171 Ark. 129, 284 S.W. 26 (1926).
95. 183 Ark. 303, 35 S.W.2d 604 (1931).
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These were sold every day, and, while the stock kept on hand was
not large, it was a stock constantly kept on hand, constantly being
sold, and replaced by other goods."
The distinction thus drawn seems tenuous at best. It is inconceiv-
able that any manufacturing business would not have as one of its
integral parts some means of disposing of its products. To describe
those means as merely incidental to the business is meaningful only
if we may assume that the owners are indulging in a hobby or that
the whole scheme is a make-work plan of some philanthropist. The
sale of lumber cut from logs at a sawmill to a lumber-yard is no more
incidental, nor any less, than the sale of bread baked at a small bakery
to customers of that bakery, whether they be wholesale or retail cus-
tomers.
The results in the Arkansas cases, however, would justify the use
of the same rationale which underlies the cases decided under the New
York statutes."7 Although the court has not placed its decisions on
such a ground, nevertheless those decisions take on meaning if we
assume that the court has in mind that where the manufacturing
business is typically one in which the manufacturer is not many steps
removed from the ultimate user of the finished products, so that it may
fairly be said that he is a merchant, i.e., a retailer or wholesaler, albeit
one who chooses to manufacture his own stock, it would be basically
unfair to treat him differently from other merchants for this purpose.
Such a rationale has the further advantage of avoiding the difficulty of
opposing relatively clear statutory language
A closely related idea is that a manufacturing business will not be
included within a bulk sales statute if the product of the business is
.old to the class of persons in the chain of distribution who would
normally be the purchasers of such a line of manufactured goods, but
that if the manufacturer adds another step in the usual distribution
process to his own business, the business will fall within the statute.
To illustrate: suppose that a manufacturer of men's suits opens a
chain of retail outlets, and uses those outlets to dispose of its manu-
factured suits. We know, of course, that in the garment business there
is usually at least one independent entrepreneur interposed between
the manufacturer and the ultimate wearer of the suit, so that in our
hypothetical case, the manufacturer has assumed functions usually
performed by someone else in that line of business.
In the case of In re Saraw,,' supra, although the statement was made
96. Gretzinger v. Wynne Wholesale Grocer Co., 183 Ark. 303, 308, 35 S.W.2d
604, 606 (1931).
97. Note, 2 BROoKLYN L. REv. 247, 250 (1933).
98. The Arkansas cases are discussed in Trammell, The Arkansas Bulk Sales
Aet-a Study in Construction, 1 ARK. L. REv. 248, 252 (1947).
99. 91 F.2d 957 (2d Cir. 1937).
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as in- the- Arkansas cases that the sales of the vinegar were merely
incidental to the manufacturing business, it is reasonably clear from
a reading of the entire opinion and the handling of the precedents
discussed in it, that the phrase "merely incidental to the manufactur-
ing business," has a somewhat different meaning from that contem-
plated in the Arkansas cases. The court stated that:
None of the cases [the New York precedents discussed, supra]
seems to us to require that the statute should be construed to apply
to a manufacturer who sells only to the wholesale trade and in the
ordinary course of business places a mortgage upon a part of the
raw materials he has acquired for the purpose of manufacturing
his final product. (Italics added.) 10
It seems clear that absent the controlling New York precedents
which the court felt would require a holding that the sale of an entire
business would be within the statute, the fact that the particular
manufacturer customarily disposed of his products in the manner
usual in that line of business would prevent his falling within the
statute.
Finally there is a suggestion in two cases which merits real con-
sideration. One-half of the existing statutesol require that the inven-
tory prepared by the seller include the cost price of the merchandise
to be sold. In both the Saraw case 0 2 and in Cooney, Eckstein & Co. v.
Sweat, 03 the use of italics and quotation marks around that particular
language is a slight indication that the courts may have been influenced
by the fact that in a manufacturing business the finished products, i.e.,
the "merchandise to be sold," does not have a cost price in the sense
in which those words were used in the context of the bulk sales stat-
utes. It is not arguable, however, that in either case this was the
stated basis for decision.
Although it is clear that the courts have not chosen to interpret bulk
sales statutes so as to include manufacturers in the vast majority of
cases, there are many indications that under some circumstances some
courts will include them. Viewed primarily as a matter of determining
legislative intention in the orthodox meaning of that phrase, two
things tend to support the conclusions of those courts which have
100. In re Saraw, 91 F.2d 957, 959 (2d Cir. 1937).
101. AI.a. CoDs tit. 20, § 10 (Supp. 1952); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 68-1501 (1947);
COLO. STAT. ANN. c. 27, 6 1 (Supp. 1952); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2101 (1953) ;
GA. CODE ANN. § 28-203 (1952); IND. ANN. STAT. § 33-201 (Burns 1949); IOWA
CODE ANN. c. 555, § 555.1 (1) (1950); LA. REv. STAkT. ANN. § 9:2962 (1950)* MS
Rsv. STAT. c. 106, § 6 (1944); MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 106, § 1 (1947); Mica. STAT.
ANN. § 19.361 (1937) ; MIxNN. STAT. ANN. § 513.18 (West 1947); MISS. CODs ANN.§ 274 (1942) ; NEB. Rsv. STAT. § 36-501 (1952) ; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-1001 (1941);
N.Y. Pmn. PROP. LAW § 44; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 39-23 (1950); N.D. REV. CODE 1 51-
0202 (1943); TENN. CODE ANN. § 7283 (Williams 1934); VT. REV. STAT. § 7846
(1947); VA. CODE § 55-83 (1950); W.Va. CODE ANN. § 4001 (1949); Wls. STAT. §
241.18 (1951); Wyo. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 41-701 (1945).
102. In re Saraw, 91 F.2d 957 (2d Cir. 1937).
103. 133 Ga. 511, 66 S.E. 257 (1909).
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excluded manufacturers. First of all is the language of the statutes.
Most of the statutes refer to merchandise or merchants, and in that
context the requirement that the cost price of items sold be given in
the inventory which must accompany the list of creditors, carries with
it a strong inference that the legislature contemplated only the sale of
things which are sold in substantially the same form in which they
were purchased, i.e., not items to which the seller has added labor.
Second is the fact that retail credit men's associations were the prim-
ary instigators of this legislation, and it may fairly be assumed that
the only businesses actually in the contemplation of the legislature
were retail mercantile businesses.
If, however, we choose to ignore these contruction aids, as many of
the courts have done, other considerations may bear on the soundness
of the result. The following idea, not completely formulated in the
cases, may be gleaned from a study of them. First, the relationship
between the manufacturing aspects and the selling aspects of the
businesses may become important. This has found expression in the
language that the sales aspect must be "merely incidental to" the
manufacturing in order that business escape the operation of the
statute. Although nowhere clearly stated in the cases, some contain a
suggestion that a manufacturer who integrates an extra step in the
marketing process beyond that usually found in his line of business
may have thus brought himself within the statute. Again there is
considerable basis for stating that although a business is a manufac-
turing business, if in its nature it must sell in such a way as to have
many characteristics of the ordinary wholesaler or retailer, it is
preferable for this purpose to treat it like wholesalers and retailers.
Perhaps that is the true rationale of the cases which speak of sales
being merely incidental to manufacturing. The New York cases also
seem in effect to adopt the rationale that if the finished product of the
manufacturer is ordinarily sold at retail, and perhaps if sold at whole-
sale, the business falls within the statute so long as some merchandise,
i.e., finished products, are included in the sale under attack.
By way of critique it may be said that although the evidence of a
legislative intention to exclude manufacturers is quite convincing,
especially the requirement that the cost price of the articles be stated,
it is not so conclusive as to render further interpretation arbitrary
Judicial conduct. Apart from the cost price language the evidence is
quite consistent with what I believe to be the true rationale of the
New York and Arkansas cases, i.e., that while some businesses may
be classified as manufacturing businesses, they may also fairly be
classified as retail or wholesale mercantile businesses, and that the
framers of the legislation did not intend to exclude any retail or whole-
sale merchants.
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d. RepGir Shops
In a later section of this article"0 the conclusion is reached that
establishments which sell services exclusively are almost never held to
be covered by bulk sales statutes. Thus it is clear that a sale in bulk
of a repair shop in which the owner has tools with which to make
repairs, but where the repairs are of such a nature as to not require
the addition of new parts, nor to demand the using up of material
supplied by the proprietor, could be made without need for compliance
with a bulk sales statute. However, the usual repair shop is one in
which a stock of repair parts, or at least material used up in making
repairs, is maintained. In a sense, in such an establishment some goods
are sold along with services, and the charges ordinarily include some
items for labor and other items for parts. Thus the question becomes
whether the fact that goods are sold in connection with labor makes
the sale of such a business, or of the stock of parts of such a business,
one which falls within the purview of bulk sales statutes.
• The cases which have considered the question are unanimous in
holding that, on those facts alone, compliance with the bulk sales
statutes- is unnecessary. 05 In holding that an automobile repair busi-
ness did not fall within the Arkansas bulk sales statute, the Supreme
Court of that state said:
" A merchant ordinarily sells his stock of goods in substantially
the same condition as he receives them, and the value of his stock
is not ordinarily enhanced by any act of the merchant while the
goods are in his possession; while here it was contemplated that
some service should be rendered the purchaser of any part of what
is called the stock on hand. 06
On the other hand, many repair shops keep on hand a stock of goods
which is sold at retail as well as used in the repair business itself.
The parts department of a garage may regularly sell certain automo-
bile parts at retail not in connection with the sale of services,"" or an
electrical repair shop may keep a regular line of electrical appliances
for ordinary sale at retail.18 In such a situation, it is clear that merely
104. Inf'ra, Section 2, g. Reference should be made, however to certain broadly-
worded statutes which suggest that businesses of the type under consideration as
well as strictly service establishments will be included. See, note 71, supra, for
quotations from the applicable provisions of some of those statutes.
105. Yeager v. Powell, 219 Ark. 713, 244 S.W.2d 141 (1951) ; Wellston Radio
Corp. v. Culberson, 175 Ark. 921, 300 S.W. 443 (1927); Fisk Rubber Co. v. Hinson
Auto Co., 168 Ark. 418, 270 S.W. 605 (1925); Harris v. Kilgore, 56 Ga. App. 516,
193 S.E. 179 (1937); Rothenheber v. Pulitzer Pub. Co., 262 S.W. 48 (Mo. App.
1924); Cross v. Inge, 105 Okla. 145, 231 Pac. 1066 (1924); Swanson v. De Vine,
49 Utah 1, 160 Pac. 872 (1916); State Bank of Viroqua v. Jackson, 261 Wis. 538,
53 N.W.2d 433 (1952).
106. Fisk Rubber Co. v. Hinson Auto Co., 168 Ark. 418, 422, 270 S.W. 605, 606(1925).
107. This apparently was the situation in Yeager v. Powell, 219 Ark. 713, 244
S.W.2d 141 (1951).
108. This was apparently the situation in Texas Hide & Leather Co. v. Bonds,
155 Okla. 3, 8 P.2d (1932).
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because the business is in part a service establishment, it is not, there-
fore, automatically outside the scope of a bulk sales statute."" Thus
in Yeager o. Powell,1 ' the Supreme Court of Arkansas held the mort-
gage of the "entire parts stock and accessories" of a combination
automobile sales agency, repair shop and supplies department thereof
to fall within the statute. There was conflicting testimony as to the
amount of parts sold at retail over the counter, the mortgagee testify-
ing that less than five per cent were sold independently of a sale of
services, while the opposing evidence apparently", showed a higher
percentage. In addition the agency was one for the sale of Nash cars,
and the evidence disclosed that more than one-half of the parts in
stock were for cars other than Nash cars."1 The court concluded that
" . . the evidence preponderates in favor of the conclusion that these
parts and supplies were merchandise . . .""1 within the meaning of
the statute.
It does not follow, however, that merely because occasional over the
counter sales are made from a stock usually kept for repair purposes,
the business will fall within the statute.114 The leading case on this
point is Swanson v. De Vine,"' in which the Supreme Court of Utah
held that the sale of a cobbler's shop did not fall within the Utah bulk
sales law merely because the cobbler made occasional sales of shoe
laces, polish, shoe brushes and inner soles from the stock which he
carried for repair purposes, where such sales averaged about five
dollars per month. The criterion seems to be a relative quantitative
one, i.e., the over the counter sales must be mere incidents of the
regular repair business and not a substantial part thereof.186
In this area the decisions are sound. The statutes were not enacted
to cover businesses in which a substantial amount of labor is neces-
109. State Bank of Viroqua v. Jackson, 261 Wis. 538, 53 N.W.2d 433 (1952):
rf. Cornish v. Nance Motor Co., 13 S.W.2d 139 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928).
110. 219 Ark. 713, 244 S.W.2d 141 (1951).
111. While the court merely states that "[a] number of witnesses testified re-
garding the extent of purchases independently made.. ." (Id. at 717, 244 S.W.2d at
143.), the inference is clear that such testimony showed that it was more than
the five percent claimed by the seller.
112. The author is at a loss to determine the relevancy of this fact, since many
garages hold themselves out to, and do in fact, repair many cars other than
those sold by a connected sales agency.
113. Yeager v. Powell, 219 Ark. 713, 717, 244 S.W.2d 141, 143 (1951).
114. Wellston Radio Corp. v. Culberson, 175 Ark. 921, 300 S.W. 443 (1927);
Fisk Rubber Co. v. Hinson Auto Co., 168 Ark. 418, 270 S.W. 605 (1925) ; Harris v.
Kilgore, 56 Ga. App. 516, 193 S.E. 179 (1937) ; Rothenheber v. Pulitzer Pub. Co.,
262 S.W. 48 (Mo. App. 1924); Cross v. Inge, 105 Okla. 145, 231 Pac. 1066 (1924);
Swanson v. De Vine, 49 Utah 1, 160 Pac. 872 (1916).
115. 49 Utah 1, 160 Pac. 872 (1916). The case was decided under the former
statute, Utah Laws 1905, c. 90, which was confined to sales of a stock of merchan-
dise. The decision, therefore, is of doubtful validity in the light of the present
broadly-worded statute discussed in note 71, upra.
116. Wellston Radio Corp. v. Culberson, 175 Ark. 921, 300 S.W. 443 (1927);
Cross v. Inge, 105 Okla. 145, 231 Pac. 1066 (1924).
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sarily sold in connection with an item in the stock-bin.'17 On the other
hand if the stock maintained serves a dual purpose, i.e., as a source
of repair parts and as an inventory to be sold at retail and then re-
plenished as in the case of ordinary retail merchants, the business
should fall within the statute. The fact of occasional deviations from
a usual practice of selling in connection with repairs should not, how-
ever, cause courts to regard what is essentially a service enterprise as
a retail mercantile establishment.
e. Restaurants and saloons.
The bulk sales statutes of several jurisdictions expressly apply to
the sale of a restaurant business," 8 and in Washington", the sale of a
bar is also expressly covered by the statute. Moreover, the Oregon,120
Idaho' 2' and Utah 22 statutes, in addition to covering restaurants ex-
pressly, seem broad enough to cover bars as well. Finally, the Illinois,12
Louisiana'2 and Nebraska"' statutes, though expressly mentioning
neither restaurants nor bars, are clearly of sufficient breadth to cover
both.
In other states the courts are presented with interpretation prob-
lems typical of these statutes. Again two lines of approach are ap-
parent, but they are less widely divergent here than elsewhere in this
general area; the overlap is marked. One group of courts has concen-
trated on close analysis of the ordinary meaning of particular words,
and has frequently attempted to distinguish contrary holdings else-
where on the basis of slight language variations, 20 variations which,
117. See 35 VA. L. REV. 123 (1949).
118. CAL. CiM. CODE 9 3440.1 (Supp. 1953): IDAHO CODE ANN. § 64-701 (1948);
Ore. Laws 1949, c. 435; UTAH CODE ANN. § 25-2-1 (1953); WASH. REv. CODE § 63.-
08.010 (1951).
119. WASH. REV. CODE § 63.08.010 (1951).
120. Ore. Laws 1949, c. 435.
121. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 64-701 (1948).
122. UTAH CODm ANN. § 25-2-1 (1953). Because of the extensive specification
of related businesses covered in the California statute and the fact that bars are
not among those businesses enumerated, it is doubtful that that statute covers
bars. CAT. Cirv. CODE S 3440.1 (Supp. 1953).
123. ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 121%, § 78 (Supp. 1952).
124. LA_ Rzv. STAT. ANN. § 9:2961 (1950).
125. NEB. Rnv. STAT. § 36-501 (1952).
126. E.g., Johnson v. Kelly, 32 N.D. 116, 155 N.W. 683 (1915) ; Plass v. Morgan,
36 Wash. 160, 78 Pac. 784 (1904). The same kind of distinction was drawn in Mis-
sos v. Spyros, 182 Wis. 631, 197 N.W. 196 (1924), but there the Wisconsin Court
was on sound ground in drawing a distinction between the Wisconsin and Illinois
statutes, since the latter is perhaps the broadest of all bulk sales statutes. In
Lewis, Hubbard & Co. v. Loughran, 85 W. Va. 235, 101 S.E. 465 (1919), the court
refused to base its holding upon any distinction in statutory wording between the
West Virginia and Washington statutes, and in so doing rejected the Washington
Court's own distinction which it drew in the Plass case. In Bolanovich v. Peter
Hauptmann Tobacco Co., 261 S.W. 723 (Mo. App. 1924), the court conceded that
while the language of the Missouri statute suggested a greater scope than that of
some other statutes, they would not construe it to cover a restaurant business.
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to this writer at least, seem not justified contextually in many in-
stances.
The purported reason for decision in another group of cases is an
application of the derogation rule which, of course, has meant a series
of holdings that restaurants are not covered by the statutes. 27 Both
because of the fact that the determination of the effect of so-called
rules of construction is difficult, and because of the overlap of approach
mentioned above, any attempt at evaluation of the impact of the der-
ogation rule would be sheer guesswork.
For three reasons an examination of the cases decided under the
Washington bulk sales statute '2 is indicated at this point: (1) many
more cases raising the issue with which we are concerned have been
decided by the Supreme Court of Washington than by any other
court,""' (2) the Washington statute has been several times amended23
and (3) as a combined result of the series of amendments as well as
the large number of cases, many of the interpretation problems re-
ferred to above have been accented. The earliest Washington statute-
applied to the purchase of "... any stock of goods, wares or merchan-
dise. . . ." In Plass v. Morgan "-" the court, in holding that the sale
of a restaurant and boarding-house was within the purview of the
statute, emphasized the breadth and scope of such words as "any" and
"stock" and so differentiated them from a common form of words
found in other statutes, "stock of merchandise," which were thought
to have a common law meaning narrower than the language of the
Washington statute.
Two months later the court, without deciding whether the sale of
the supplies of a saloon fell within the act, held that a cash register
which was included in the sale but which was not itself kept for sale
was not a part of the goods covered by the statute."3 In 1913, how-
The court held the "settled construction" of the statute to be that it covers 1... the
same scope and purposes as the acts of other states relating to the same subject."
Id. at 724.
127. Swift & Co. v. Tempelos, 178 N.C. 487, 101 S.E. 8 (1919); O'Connor v.
Smith, 188 Va. 214, 49 S.E.2d 310 (1948); Missos v. Spyros, 182 Wis. 631, 197
N.W. 196 (1924). See also, Johnson v. Kelly, 32 N.D. 116, 155 N.W. 683 (1915),
where the act is referred to as "drastic," and Lewis, Hubbard & Co. v. Loughran,
85 Va. 235, 101 S.E. 465 (1919), where the act is said to merit a strict construc-
tion because it restrains the right to alien property.
128. Presently, WAsH. REV. CODE §§ 63.08.010-63.08.060 (1951).
129. Five cases involving restaurants and three cases involving saloons have
been decided by the Supreme Court of Washington.
130. The original version is found in Wash. Laws 1901, c. CIX. Amendments
are found in Wash. Laws 1913, c. 175; Wash. Laws Ex. Sess. 1925, p. 342; Wash.
Laws 1939, c. 122; Wash. Laws 1943, c. 98.
131. Wash. Laws 1901, c. CIX.
132. 36 Wash. 160, 78 Pac. 784 (1904).
133. Albrecht v. Cudihee, 37 Wash. 206, 79 Pac. 628 (1905).
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
ever, in Friedman v. Branner,1 34 the court stated that it was beyond
doubt that the sale of a saloon business fell within the statute.
In 1925 the legislature amended the statute to read in part as fol-
lows:
Any sale ... of all or substantially all of any stock of goods,
wares or merchandise, and/or all or substantially all of the fix-
tures and equipment used in and about the business of a vendor
engaged in the business of buying and selling and dealing in goods,
wares or merchandise, of any kind or description ... 21 [Italics
added.]
When Garner v. Thompson1 6 was decided in 1931, the court, after
a careful examination of decisions from other jurisdictions, concluded
that a restaurant business was not one in which the owner engaged in
"buying and selling and dealing in merchandise," the new statutory
test, primarily on the ground that one who buys, sells and deals in
merchandise is a merchant, and that a merchant sells the same thing
he buys without substantially altering its form.
The statute was amended again in 1939127 to cover expressly restau-
rants, as well as certain other establishments in which services play
an important if not a dominant role. Three later Washington cases '"
have, of course, recognized that the interpretation problem with re-
spect to the inclusion of restaurants has been solved at one simple
stroke by the legislature.
In retrospect the following observations seem pertinent. While the
initial Washington statute was, arguably, broader in its terms than
certain other bulk sales statutes, yet it is dubious that the language
distinction relied on so heavily by the court was warranted, for there
was no weighty internal evidence, and certainly no external evidence
was referred to, to indicate a legislative purpose to cover a wider range
of businesses than that contemplated by other statutes. The 1925
amendment clearly placed the Washington statute on the same level of
definiteness (or ambiguity, if you will) as that of most other bulk sales
statutes, and so the same need for interpretation arose as existed else-
where, although it might be contended that the narrower wording was
itself an indication of a legislative intention to cut down the scope of
the statute. Possibly the legislature chose this method of expressing
dissatisfaction with the decision in the Plass case.139 In any event,
134. 72 Wash. 338, 130 Pac. 360 (1913); see Seattle Brewing & Malting Co. v.
Donofrio, 34 Wash. 18, 74 Pac. 823 (1904).
135. Wash. Laws Ex. Sess. 1925, p. 342.
136. 161 Wash. 317, 296 Pac. 1043 (1931).
137. Wash. Laws 1939, c. 122.
138. Rustuen v. Apro, 243 P.2d 479 (Wash. 1952) ; Minder v. Gurley, 222 P.2d
185 (Wash. 1950) ; Electrical Products Consolidated v. Smyser, 19 Wash. 2d 509,
143 P.2d 452 (1943).
139. Driscoll, The "Sales in Bulk" Act, 4 WASH. L. Rav. 97, 100 (1929), takes
the position that the 1925 amendment was clearly intended to confine the operation
of the statute to mercantile businesses. The author of that article based his conclu-
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tL. court, wisely it would seem, sought the aid of precedents else-
where, and found them in basic agreement. Then came the final solu-
tion of the problem, a single legislative decision which ended the con-
troversy.
Surely, however, we should not disguise the fact, by discussing legis-
lative-intent-seeking in a situation in which there is no substantial
evidence of any intent, that what we have observed is merely the
ordinary process of relieving the court from the necessity of making,
or adhering to already made, value judgments on the issue of whether
restaurants ought to be covered by bulk sales statutes.
In addition to the Washington cases, only three states having the
broadly-worded or expressly inclusive statutes discussed, supra,1 40
have passed upon the question of whether a restaurant is covered by
the statute, and, of course, in all of the cases the question has been
answered in the affirmative. 41 All other cases in point were decided
under statutes which have left the courts considerable leeway in
reaching their conclusions.14 Only in Maryland 143 and Michigan"
have the courts held the more usual type of statute applicable to the
sale of a restaurant business. In each other case the court has indi-
cated that restaurants are not contemplated by the statutory lan-
guage."
sions in this regard on the notes of the Revision Committee of the Washington
Legislature which were made available to him as well as information given to
him personally by the draftsman of the 1925 act. Id. at 97, note 6.
140. See notes 118 to 125, supra.
141. fi re Bowers. 33 F. Sunm 965 (S.D. Cal. 1940); Sampson v. Boysen, 9
Cal. App. 2d 413, 50 P.2d 95 (1935); Copeliares v. Copeliares, 297 Ill. App. 647,
18 N.E.2d 120 (1938); Goldberg v. Martin, 203 La. 70, 13 So.2d 465 (1943). But
.ee, Denekamp v. Heisler, 12 La. App. 471, 126 So. 447 (1930), holding that a
boarding-house does not come within the scope of the statute.
142. In re Henningsen, 297 Fed. 821 (2d Cir. 1924); D. C. Goff Co. v. First
State Bank of DeQueen, 175 Ark. 158, 298 S.W. 884 (1927) ; Farmers' & Drovers'
National Bank v. Hannaman, 115 Kan. 370, 223 Pac. 478 (1924); Calvert Building
& Construction Co. v. Winakur. 154 Md. 519, 141 Atl. 355 (1928); Sakelos v.
Hutchinson Brothers, 129 Md. 300, 99 Atl. 357 (1916); Michigan Packing Co. v.
Messaris, 257 Mich. 422, 241 N.W. 236 (1932) ; Carnaggio Bros. v. City of Green-
wood, 142 Miss. 885, 108 So. 141 (1926); Bolanovich v. Peter Hauptmann Tobacco
Co., 261 S.W. 723 (Mo. App. 1924) ; Gallup v. Rhodes, 207 Mo. App. 692, 230 S.W.
664 (1921); Swift & Co. v. Tempelos, 178 N.C. 487, 101 S.E. 8 (1919); Johnson
v. Kelly, :32 N.D. 116, 155 N.W. 683 (1915); Straus Cigar Co. v. Bon Marche, 142
Tenn. 129, 218 S.W. 219 (1919); Daggett v. Wolff, 44 S.W.2d 1063 (Tex. Civ. App.
1931) ; O'Connor v. Smith, 188 Va. 214, 49 S.E.2d 310 (1948); Lewis, Hubbard &
Co. v. Loughran, 85 W. Va. 235, 101 S.E. 465 (1919); Missos v. Spyros, 182 Wis.
631, 197 N.W. 196 (1924).
143. Calvert Building & Construction Co. v. Winakur, 154 Md. 519, 141 Atl.
l55 (1928) ; Sakelos v. Hutchinson Brothers, 129 Md. 300, 99 At. 357 (1916).
144. Michigan Packing Co. v. Messaris, 257 Mich. 422, 241 N.W. 236 (1932).
145. Although neither the Supreme Court nor the Superior Court of Pennsyl-
vania has passed upon the precise question, it has several times been decided in the
lower Pennsylvania courts, but the decisions are in hopeless conflict. That a res-
taurant is not covered, see Weiner v. Everglades, 33 Del. Co. R. 280 (1945);
Cressman v. Haas, 64 Pitts. L.J. 499 (1916). That a restaurant is covered, see
Lazofson v. Steiner, 66 Pa. D. & C. 179 (1948); Martindale v. Knight, 25 Pa.
Dist. 469 (1916).
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Two distinct theories underlie the line of decisions which hold ':!t
restaurants fall outside the purview of the usual type of bulk sales
statute. One is that the serving of food in a restaurant is an uttering
and not a sale ;146 the other is that the statutes were not designed to
apply to situations in which the seller has substantially changed the
form of the product sold,147 in this instance by the addition of a sub-
stantial amount of labor.
The case most clearly based on the former rationale is O'Connor v.
Smith.148 There the Supreme Court of Errors of Virginia applied the
derogation rule in spite of dicta in an earlier case 49 that the statute,
being remedial in nature, should be so construed as to advance the
remedy. The court, relying exclusively on encyclopedic authority,
found the overwhelming majority opinion to be that ". . . a restau-
rant business is not one involving the carrying of a stock of merchan-
dise or the buying and selling of merchandise."'5 0 The opinion also
contains a long quotation from one of the leading encyclopedias to
the effect that both at common law and under the Uniform Sales Act,
there is no sale when a restaurant keeper supplies his guests with
food. Whatever may be the correct, or preferred, interpretation of
the statute in this factual situation, the reasoning of the Virginia
court is especially deplorable for two reasons: (1) the old distinction
between selling and uttering has been properly subjected to much
criticism and is on the wane1 51 and (2) the solution to the problem
under discussion should not be based upon overly-technical common
law distinctions designed for a different purpose.5 2 If in fact a restau-
rant business, judged by proper criteria, contains the same risks and
receives credit upon the same basis as do businesses clearly within the
scope of bulk sales statutes, and if, as suggested, the statutes them-
selves provide relatively little guidance, it should be included. If
differences, both significant and material, are found, of course the
opposite conclusion should be reached.
The "substantial change of form" rationale, however, underlies a
146. See, MuaCK, THE SALa OF FOOD AND DRINK AT COMviON LAW AND UNDER
THE UNIFORM SALEs AcT, pp. 165 et seq. (1936), for a discussion of the historical
basis of the concept of uttering.
147. For the same argument as applied to manufacturers, see discussion at
notes 40 to 43, supra.
148. 188 Va. 214, 49 S.E.2d 310 (1948).
149. Trimble v. Covington Grocery Co., 112 Va. 826, 72 S.E. 724 (1911).
150. O'Connor v. Smith, 188 Va. 214, 219, 49 S.E.2d 310, 312 (1948).
151. MELIcK, op. cit. supra note 146, at 166 n. 18: for a concise and well-
reasoned opinion rejecting the "uttering concept," see Temple v. Keeler, 238 N.Y.
344, 144 N.E. 635 (1924).
152. The principal purpose for the distinction is to differentiate cases in which
there is a warranty of fitness implied from those in which liability is based on
negligence, or to state it differently, is one who serves food absolutely liable or
only liable upon proof of fault? Furthermore, Melick points out that the restaura-
teur as we know him today would have been considered a trader or seller under
the English common law, for the uttering concept referred only to innkeepers, and
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much larger group of cases,' in which the opinions rest upon some-
what firmer ground. Representative is Farmers' & Drovers' National
Bank o. Hannaman,',' a case which relied to a considerable extent
upon the leading case of Swift & Co. v. Tempelos.'3 The Kansas court
held that while a restaurateur buys merchandise and resells it, never-
theless, the change in form is so substantial as to preclude a holding
that he is a merchant. These opinions at least have the merit of com-
ing closer to stating the real reasons which underlie their decisions.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court of Michigan 56 has taken the
position that a restaurant business falls within the Michigan bulk
mortgages statute.1, 7 Disregarding authorities elsewhere on the
ground that they are in conflict, but finding some support from the
Maryland decisions, -" the Michigan court reasoned:
It is a matter of common knowledge that, in the conduct of the
restaurant business, certain items of food, such as butter, milk,
cream, and oftentimes bread and pastries, are retailed for con-
sumption by customers upon the premises in exactly the same
form as purchased by the restaurateur for use in his business.
Obviously it is a fair interpretation of the statute to give to the
one furnishing these items of merchandise to the restaurateur the
same protection as though furnished to a retail grocer.'
It is not readily apparent that one who is engaged in selling goods
for resale is necessarily entitled to such uniformity of protection,
regardless of the varying kinds of business to which he chooses to sell.
Presumably a wholesaler is aware that different kinds of businesses
represent, oftentimes, different kinds of credit risks, and that different
items may serve as the basis for security in different businesses. Thus,
he should realize that he may have to impose different credit terms, or
use varying kinds of security devices, in one situation from what he
must use in another. To reiterate: while it may be true that testing
by proper criteria would lead to the conclusion that restaurants should
be held to fall within bulk sales statutes, yet the criterion used by the
Michigan court seems an entirely irrelevant one.
then only "... if he merely furnished as an entirety, for a reasonable sum, food,
drink and lodging as a part of the general entertainment supplied all guests .... "
MELICK, op. cit. supra note 146 at 173. For a short discussion, see, 1 WILLISTON,
SALES, I 242b (Rev. ed. 1948).
153. Farmers' & Drovers' National Bank v. Hannaman, 115 Kan. 370, 223 Pac.
478 (1924); Bolanovich v. Peter Hauptmann Tobacco Co., 261 S.W. 723 (Mo.
App. 1924); Swift & Co. v. Tempelos, 178 N.C. 487, 101 S.E. 8 (1919). The same
idea seems to be in the background in Lewis, Hubbard & Co. v. Loughran, 85 W.
Va. 235, 101 S.E. 465 (1919).
154. 115 Kan. 370, 223 Pac. 478 (1924).
155. 178 N.C. 487, 101 S.E. 8 (1919).
156. Michigan Packing Co. v. Messaris, 257 Mich. 422, 241 N.W. 236 (1932).
157. MIcH. STAT. ANN. If 19.371 to 19.373 (1937).
158. Calvert Building & Construction Co. v. Winakur, 154 Md. 519, 141 Atl. 355(1928); Sakelos v. Hutchinson Brothers, 129 Md. 300, 99 At. 357 (1916).
159. Michigan Packing Co. v. Messaris, 257 Mich. 422, 426, 241 N.W. 236, 237
(1932).
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It was suggested earlier in this article that the problem of what
businesses are covered is closely related to, often inseparable from, the
problem of what goods are included. 60 That statement finds unusual
application here. Although it is true that under both the broadly-
worded statutes and the expressly inclusive statutes discussed,
supra,'61 a sale of fixtures alone is interdicted, the answer is not so
clear under the more usual type of statute. In jurisdictions having
such a statute the question of whether the sale of fixtures alone is
covered often becomes decisive, especially if the court, as it frequently
does, takes the position that supplies sold form an insubstantial por-
tion of the whole subject-matter of the transaction and so treats the
case as one in which fixtures alone are sold.V 62
Several cases have been found in, which one of two situations. ob-
tains: (1) the supplies were excluded from the sale,03 or (2) the
supplies constituted such an insubstantial part of the whole trans-
action as to be regarded as de minimis by the court.8 4 The fact that
the supplies of a restaurant often are of relatively little value when
compared with the fixtures and other equipment is readily under-
standable since so much of the supplies of a restaurant takes the form
of perishables and therefore a large inventory cannot be maintained.
As will become apparent in the discussion in a later article,0 8 the sale
of fixtures alone is not ordinarily interdicted by bulk sales statutes,
and so the whole transaction has been frequently held to fail'outside
the scope of the statute. All of this, i.e., that non-merchandise itens
monopolize the list of assets of a restaurant business, points to the
conclusion that such a business is so unlike the ordinary retail grocery
store in terms of what credit and security methods should be employed
that it should not be treated in the same way for bulk sales purposes.
As in the cases relating to repair shops, M6 it is abundantly clear that
if the court otherwise takes the position that a restaurant should not
be included within the scope of bulk sales statutes, the fact of inci-
160. Introduction, supra.
161. See notes 118 to 125, supra.
162. Gallup v. Rhodes, 207 Mo. App. 692, 230 S.W. 664 (1921); Johnson v.
Kelly, 32 N.D. 116, 55 N.W. 683 (1915); Straus Cigar Co. v. Bon Marche, 142
Tenn. 129, 218 S.W. 219 (1919); Lewis, Hubbard & Co. v. Loughran, 85 W. Va.
235, 101 S.E. 465 (1919). In Carnaggio Bros. v. City of Greenwood, 142 Miss. 885,
108 So. 141 (1926), only fxtures were sold, but it is impossible to determine
whether that fact was controlling. The language is:
We are of the opinion that... [the bulk sales lawJ does not apply to a busi-
ness of this kind. The running of a restaurant is not a mercantile business
within the meaning of this statute, where no merchandise is sold in the sale
of the business.
Id. at 893, 108 So. at 142.
163. Carnaggio Bros. v. City of Greenwood, 142 Miss. 885, 108 So. 141 (1926).
164. See cases cited note 162, supra.
165. See Miller, Bulk Sales Laws: Property Included, to appear in the April,
1954, issue of the Washington University Law Quarterly.
166. See section 2, d., supra.
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dental sales in relatively small quantities of items which are taken out
of the restaurant for consumption will not be sufficient to convert an
otherwise excluded business into an included one. G7
Surprisingly enough, however, the courts which have passed on the
question have almost unanimously held that saloons fall within the
purview of bulk sales statutes.' * In fact, one court which has ex-
cluded restaurants '" has included saloons.1 ° It is true, however, that
the holding in the saloon case' 71 was to some degree weakened by the
language and holding of the later restaurant case. 72
It is only in the latter case, Bolanovich v. Peter Hauptmann Tobacco
Co.," ; that any rationale has been offered to support the inclusion of
saloons and the exclusion of restaurants. There it was suggested that
a saloon-keeper sold articles in the same packages in which they were
purchased; presumably the restaurateur did not. It is true that ordi-
narily there was a lesser change of form and that service formed less
of the total product in the case of the typical pre-prohibition saloon
than in the case of a restaurant. However, it is extremely doubtful
that in a modern bar less of the cost of the product is attributable to
overhead, entertainment and other service features than in the case
of the modern restaurant. Of course, the court in the Bolanbvich case
may have had its attention focused on the relatively insubstantial
change of form as well as the actual amount of service rendered rather
than on the proportion of the total cost of the final product properly
allocable as service and overhead expenses. Furthermore the drinking
habits of patrons of modern bars are somewhat different today from
those of the patrons of the pre-prohibition corner saloon in the sense
that a higher proportion of the patrons now ask for drinks which are
quite different from their original in-the-bottle form.
The problem of the sale of fixtures and other equipment in connec-
I 67. D.C. Goff Co. v. First State Bank of DeQueen, 175 Ark. 158, 298 S.W. 884
(1927); Bolanovich v. Peter Hauptmann Tobacco Co., 261 S.W. 723 (Mo. App.
1924) ; O'Connor v. Smith, 188 Va. 214, 49 S.E.2d 310 (1948).
168. Parham & Co. v. Potts-Thompson Liquor Co., 127 Ga. 303, 56 S.E. 460(1907); Herschi v. H. Albrecht & Co., 202 Ill. App. 573 (1916); Porter v. Goud-
zwaard, 162 Mich. 158, 127 N.W. 295 (1910); Kolander v. Dunn, 95 Minn. 422,
104 N.W. 371 (1905); Semmes v. Rudolph Stecher Brewing Co., 195 Mo. App. 621,
187 S.W. 604 (1916); Escalle v. Mark, 43 Nev. 172, 183 Pac. 387 (1919); Marshon
v. Toohey, 38 Nev. 248, 148 Pac 357 (1915); Friedman v. Branner, 72 Wash. 338,
130 Pac. 360 (1913); Albrecht v. Cudihee, 37 Wash. 206, 79 Pac. 628 (1905).
Contra. Pritz v. Jones, 117 App. Div. 643, 102 N.Y. Supp. 549 (1st Dep't 1907).
But see, Stumpp & Walter Co. v. Napanoch Country Club, Inc., 198 Misc. 600, 102
N.Y S.2d 189 (Sup. Ct. 19,50).
169. Bolanovich v. Peter Hauptmann Tobacco Co., 261 S.W. 723 (Mo. App.
1924); Gallup v. Rhodes, 207 Mo. App. 692, 230 S.W. 664 (1921).
170. Semmes v. Rudolph Stecher Brewing Co., 195 Mo. App. 621, 187 S.W. 604
(1916).
171. Ibid.
172. Bolanovich v. Peter Hauptmann Tobacco Co., 261 S.W. 723 (Mo. App.
1924).
17.0. Ibhl.
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tion with inventory recurs in these cases 17 4 Some courts have in-
cluded in goods covered the fixtures or other equipment so long as some
inventory was sold,17 while others have held that where inventory,
fixtures and other equipment are sold, only the inventory is covered
by the statute.1 6 The solution of that problem depends upon factors
to be discussed in a later article.1?7 It should be mentioned, however,
that courts have more help here from the statutory language itself
than in many other areas.'78
To summarize, certain statutes are so worded as to include clearly
both restaurants and bars, but most of the statutes leave room for
interpretation. Although most of those courts whose decisions were
not controlled by the statutory language itself have held restaurants
to fall outside the statute and bars to fall within, there is a dissenting
view. Courts excluding restaurants adopt one of two rationales: (a)
serving food in a restaurant is not a sale but a mere uttering of it, or
(b) the statutes cover only businesses in which the product sold under-
goes no substantial change of form. In several of the cases the deroga-
tion rule has been used as a prop to support the decisions.
On the other hand only two of the courts, unhampered by precise
legislative language, have chosen to include restaurants, one without
offering a rationale, the other on the basis of a seemingly irrelevant
one. The rationale offered by the only court which has attempted to
differentiate the treatment accorded bars from that accorded restau-
rants is tenuous at best, and perhaps represents only a retrenchment
from a previously taken position. If we grant that bars do differ from
restaurants in two respects, i.e., (1) on the whole there is less change
of form in the case of a saloon than a restaurant, and (2) something
which has not been mentioned in the cases, that a saloon-keeper can
and does carry larger inventories and needs less fixtures and other
equipment with the result that inventory forms a much higher per-
centage of his total assets than in the case of a restaurateur, yet from
174. Parham & Co. v. Potts-Thompson Liquor Co., 127 Ga. 303, 56 S.E. 460(1907); Kolander v. Dunn, 95 Minn 422 104 N.W. 371 (1905); Gallup v. Rhodes,
207 Mo. App. 692, 230 S.W. 664 (1921); iarshon v. Toohey, 38 Nev. 248, 148 Pac.
357 (1915) ; Albrecht v. Cudihee, 37 Wash. 206, 79 Pac. 628 (1905).
175. Parham & Co. v. Potts-Thompson Liquor Co., 127 Ga. 303, 56 S.E. 460(1907) ; Semmes v. Rudolph Stecher Brewing Co., 195 Mo. App. 621, 187 S.W. 604
(1916).
176. Kolander v. Dunn, 95 Minn. 422, 104 N.W. 371 (1905); Marshon v. Toohey,
38 Nev. 248, 148 Pac. 357 (1915).
177. See Miller, Bullk Sales Laws: Property Included, to appear in the April,
1954. issue of the Washington University Law Quarterly.
178. Thus the language of many statutes makes it quite clear whether a sale
of fixtures alone, in the situation where the business is otherwise clearly covered,
necessitates compliance with the act. Compare, e.g., MICH. STAT. AN&. 1 19.361(1937), "The sale... of a stock of merchandise, or merchandise and the fixtures
pertaining to . . "' (Italics added.), with Mo. Rsv. STAT. § 427.010 (1949),
"The sale... of a stock of merchandise, or merchandise, fixtures and equipment,
or equipment pertaining to ... " (Italics added.)
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the broader view of the essentially service nature of the functions
performed by both, it is difficult to conclude that they should be treated
differently for bulk sales purposes.
f. Farmers
The argument that farmers come within the purview of bulk sales
statutes seems to have been urged seriously before the courts of but
two states, Illinois and New Jersey. The New Jersey and Illinois
courts reached opposite conclusions, the former excluding 1 , and the
latter including"', farmers. The factors affecting decision in these
cases are, broad considerations which may be described in terms of
the over-all attitude of the court toward the particular statute in-
volved, particularly in the light of its legislative and judicial history.
As was recounted, supra,", the decisions interpreting the Illinois
statute' "- still reflect the impact of the original Illinois case 8 3 which
held the first statute"' in that state unconstitutional as class legisla-
tion. The Illinois court, from the first, took the position that the new
Illinois statute' was aimed at meeting the objections to the earlier
one ;'- more specifically, that it was a statute so broad in its coverage
as to preclude the success of any contention that it was discriminatory
against certain kinds of businesses. As a result, the court has con-
sistently given the statute the broadest possible interpretation.8 7
Conversely, the New Jersey court has, from the beginning,18s dem-
onstrated antipathy toward its statute and, perhaps more than any
other court, has emphasized the need for a strict construction of it
because of its being in derogation of the common law.289 Thus, in
spite of the not generally recognized fact that the language of the
179. Samuelson v. Goldberg, 13 N.J. Misc. 204, 177 AtI. 260 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
180. Coon v. Doss, 361 IM. 515, 198 N.E. 341 (1935); Weskalines v. Hesterman.
288 Ill. 199, 123 N.E. 314 (1919) ; Tipsword v. Doss, 273 I1. App. 1 (1933) ; Lar-
son v. Judd, 200 Ill. App. 420 (1916); see also, Main v. Hall, 41 F.2d 715 (7th Cir.
1930) ; Swern v. Liggett, 51 F.2d 821 (E.D. Ill. 1931).
181. See note 68, supra, and discussion in text at that point.
182. The present statute is ILL. ANN. STAT. C. 121%, §§ 78 to 81 (Supp. 1952).
183. Charles J. Off & Co. v. Morehead, 235 Ill. 40, 85 N.E. 264 (1908).
184. Ill. Laws 1905, p.28 4.
185. I1. Laws 1913, p.2 58 .
186. Weskanies v. Hesterman, 288 II. 199, 123 N.E. 314 (1919).
187. At least, a broad interpretation is given to it on the issue of what busi-
nesses are covered, although the court has stated that the derogation rule is ap-
plicable. Coon v. Doss, 361 Ill. 515, 198 N.E. 341 (1935). The following cases
have interpreted the act broadly so as to include businesses not covered by some
other acts: Coon v. Doss, supra; Luthy & Co. v. Paradis, 299 111. 380, 132 N.E.
556 (1921); LaSalle Opera House Co. v. LaSalle Amusement Co., 289 111. 194,
124 N.E. 454 (1919); Weskalnies v. Hesterman, 288 Ill. 199, 123 N.E. 314 (1919).
188. See, e.g., Muller v. Hubschman, 84 N.J. Eq. 30, 96 AtI. 189 (Ch. 1914).
189. E.g., Schwartz v. King Realty & Investment Co., 93 N.J.L. 111, 107 AtI.
154 (Sup. Ct. 1919).
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New Jersey statute 90 is equally as broad as that of the Illinois
statute, 91 a series of New Jersey cases 92 has so interpreted it, that
for practical purposes it is one of the narrower statutes. Thus in
Samuelson v. Goldberg,193 the Supreme Court held that farmers were
not covered, relying on the language in the earlier Court of Errors
and Appeals decision of Van Genderen v. Arrow Bus Lines, Inc.,T0
which stated clearly the outer limits of the New Jersey statute as
follows:
[T] he class of vendors embraced in the statutory provisions
are those whose business is the sale of stock or merchandise to
intending customers who resort to the place where such stock or
merchandise is kept for sale to such persons. The prohibition of
the statute, as we see it, is directed solely at the bulk sale of this
stock or merchandise by a person carrying on such business, and
includes the sale of the fixtures used by such person in the carry-
ing on of that business.1 15
Beyond these cases, the conclusion that farmers are not included
within the scope of bulk sales legislation is strengthened by the exclu-
sion of businesses less unlike retail merchants than are farmers 9 In
the light of both the purpose properly ascribable to legislatures in
passing bulk sale legislation, and the fact that extension of credit to
farmers is at least not so directly related to the existence of a specific
inventory which can be looked to for payment, the non-inclusion of
farmers seems proper.
g. Businesses in which only services are sold.
Several bulk sales statutes specifically include certain exclusively
service businesses, 197 and some others are so broadly worded as to
190. N.J. STAT. ANN. §46: 29-1 (1940) provides in part: "The sale in bulk of
the whole or a large part of the stock of merchandise and fixtures or merchandise
or fixtures, or goods and chattels, otherwise than in the ordinary course of trade
and in the regular and usual prosecution of the seller's business or occupation
." (Italics added).
191. ILL. ANN. STAT. C. 121'A, § 78 (Supp. 1952) provides in part: "The sale
..in bulk of the major part or the whole of a stock of merchandise, or merchan-
dise and fixtures or other goods and chattels of the vendor's business . . ." (Italics
added). If anything, it would appear that the additional words "or occupation"
in the New Jersey statute makes that law the broader of the two.
192. See, particularly, VanGenderen v. Arrow Bus Lines, Inc., 107 N.J. Eq.
217, 151 AtI. 605 (Ct. Err. & App. 1930); Schwartz v. King Realty & Investment
Co., 93 NJ.L. 111, 107 AtI. 154 (Sup. Ct. 1919); Muller v. Hubschman, 84 N.J.
Eq. 30, 96 Atl. 189 (Ch. 1914).193. 13 N.J. MIisc. 204, 177 Atl 260" (Sup. Ct. 1935).
194. 107 NJ. Eq. 217, 151 AtI. 605 (Ct. Err. & App. 1930).
195. Id. at 219, 151 Atl. at 606.
196. See the discussion suprc, Sections 2, b., c., d., and e.
197. CAL. Civ. CODE § 3440.1 (Supp. 1953) ... of the fixtures, or store equip-
ment, of a baker, cafe or restaurant owner, garage owner, machinist, cleaner and
dyer ... "; IDAHo CoDs ANN. § 64-.701 (1948) " ... or supplies of a hotel, res-
taurant, barber shop or any place of business .... "; WASH. Buy. CODE § 63.08.010
(1951) "...or... a restaurant, cafe, beer parlor, tavern, hotel, club, or gasoline
service station .... "
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cover service establishments."", However, no cases have been found
which have been decided under any of the statutes specifically includ-
ing certain service establishments, although several cases1  have been
decided under the broadly-worded Illinois statute.21 0 Only two cases 20 1
have been found in which it has been held that an enterprise which
sells only services falls within the scope of the putatively applicable
bulk sales statute, and one of those is the Illinois case.- 2 The latter
is explicable in terms of the legislative and judicial history of the
Illinois statute.-0 All other cases have held that the bulk sales legisla-
tion was not intended to be applied to establishments which sell no
goods.="
Thus, even the Supreme Court of Michigan, which has displayed a
fairly consistent friendly attitude toward the Michigan bulk sales and
bulk mortgages statutes,-' ' refused to accept the argument that when
the bulk mortgages statute was amended in 1931 to read "any said
business"-.' instead of the earlier "said business" 2 7 there was an in-
tention to extend the scope of the statute to cover noh-merchandise
businesses. ' Likewise, the Supreme Court of Washington, in Everett
198. ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 121% , § 78 (Supp. 1952); Ns. REv. STAT. § 36-501(1952); Ore. Laws 1949, c. 435. See also N. J. STAT. ANN. § 46:29-1 (1940) and
the discussion of the interpretation of that statute at notes 188 to 195, 6upra.
199, LaSalle Opera House Co. v. LaSalle Amusement Co., 289 Ill. 194, 124 N.E.
454 (1919); St. Paul-Mercury Indemnity Company of Saint Paul v. Hoey, 325
I1. App. 693, 60 N.E.2d 641 (1945); Page v. Wright, 194 Ill. App. 149 (1915).
In Athon v. McAllister, 205 Ill. App. 41 (1917), the business sold was a combina-
tion drayage and farming business. In holding that the sale of the assets of
both businesses fell within the statute, the court declined to follow the earlier
cases of H. S. Richardson Coal Co. v. Cermak, 190 111. App. 106 (1914), and
Heslop v. Golden, 189 Ill. App. 388 (1914), (which had held that the statute was
confined to mercantile businesses) on the ground that they were in conflict with
G. S. Johnson Co. v. Beloosky, 263 Ill. 363, 105 N.E. 287 (1914).
200. ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 1211/, § 78 (Supp. 1952).
201. LaSalle Opera House Co. v. LaSalle Amusement Co., 289 Ill. 194, 124 N.E.
454 (1919) ; Flushing National Bank in New York v. Abrams, 270 App. Div. 911,
1 N.Y.S.2d 609 (2d Dep't 1946), aff'd mer., 296 N.Y. 1009,73 N.E.2d 582 (1947).
202. LaSalle Opera House Co. v. LaSalle Amusement Co., 289 Ill. 194, 124 N.E.
454 1919).
202. See the discussion at notes 66 to 68, ,spra.
204. St. Matthews Motor Co. v. Schnepp, 306 Ky. 823, 209 S.W.2d 481 (1948);
Item Co., Ltd. v. National Dyers & Cleaners, Ltd., 15 La. App. 108, 130 So. 879(1930); Deverges -. National Dyers & Cleaners, Ltd. 15 La. App. 339, 130 So.
882 (1930) ; Flint Citizens Loan & Investment Co. v. Moss, 265 Mich. 40, 251 N.W.
347 (1933); Balter & Miller v. Crum, 199 Mo. App. 380, 203 S.W. 506 (1918);
Van Genderen v. Arrow Bus Lines, Inc., 107 N.J. Eq. 217, 151 AtI. 605 (Ct. Err.
& App. 1930); Begnell v. Safety Coach Line, Inc., 198 N.C. 688, 153 S.E. 264(1930); Miller v. Lincoln, 43 Pa. C.C. 557 (1915); Gaspee Cab, Inc. v. McGovern,
51 RI. 247, 153 AtI. 870 (1931); Everett Produce Co. v. Smith Bros., 40 Wash.
566, 82 Pac. 905 (1905).
205. For a discussion of the Michigan Court's treatment of its statutes, see
Introduction stupra.
206. Mich. Acts 1931, No. 198.
207. Mich. Acts 1929, No. 200.
208. Flint Citizens Loan & Investment Co. v. Moss, 265 Mich. 40, 251 N.W. 347
(1933).
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Produce Co. v. Smith Bros.,200 declined to extend the coverage of the
Washington statute-10 to the sale of a livery stable business. In so
holding, the Court distinguished the earlier Washington case of Plass
v. Morgan,211 which held that the sale of a restaurant fell within the
scope of the, statute, on the ground that in the restaurant case, al-
though there was a change of form, a product was sold, while in the
case of a livery stable nothing but services were sold. Similarly courts
have excluded sales of fleets of busses and taxicabs.
21 2
The decision of the Supreme Court of Illinois holding that sale of a
lease-hold interest in a theatre, with all the furniture, fixtures, equip-
ment and other tangible property as well as the good will of the the-
atrical business and its trademarks and trade-names, was interdicted
by the Illinois statute was an entirely expectable decision in the light
of its earlier interpretatio. 213
The Illinois Court, relying on Weskalnies v. Hesterman,21 said:
. . . [T]he act applied to any sale in bulk of the major part or all
of the goods and chattels of the vendor's business .... [Italics
added.]"1
Flushing National Bank in New York v. Abramse" cannot be so
easily understood. There the New York Court of Appeals affirmed a
decision of the Appellate Division that a dry-cleaning business was
covered by the statute. When it is recalled that the New York courts
first approached bulk sales legislation in a hostile manner, declaring
the original statute unconstitutional2l' and applying the derogation
rule to the later ones, 218 at least initially, it is difficult to understand
the holding in this case. True it is that the more recent New York
cases have obviously abandoned the derogation rule, and that many
liberal-in-fact interpretations have been given the New York statute,lD
yet there has been no indication in any of them that the statute would
209. 40 Wash. 566, 82 Pac. 905 (1905).
210. Wash. Laws 1901, c. CIX.
211. 36 WASH. 160, 78 Pac. 784 (1904).
212. St. Matthews Motor Co. v. Schnepp, 306 Ky. 823, 209 S.W.2d 481 (1948);
Van Genderen v. Arrow Bus Lines, Inc., 107 N.J. Eq. 217, 151 Atl. 605 (Ct. Err.
& App. 1930); Begnell v. Safety Coach Line, Inc., 198 N.C. 688, 153 S.E. 264
(1980); Gaspee Cab, Inc. v. McGovern, 51 R.I. 247, 153 Atl. 870 (1931).
213. See the discussion at note 70 suprm.
214. 288 IM. 199, 123 N.E. 314 (1919). The case held that the Illinois statute
applied to farmers.
215. LaSalle Opera House Co. v. LaSalle Amusement Co., 289 I1. 194, 196, 124
X.E. 454, 455 (1919).
216. 270 App. Div. 911, 61 N.Y.S.2d 609 (2d Dep't 1946), aff'd mnem., 296 N.Y.
1009, 73 N.E.2d 582 (1947).
217. N.Y. Laws 1902, c. 528, was declared unconstitutional in a four-three
decision in Wright v. Hart, 182 N.Y. 330, 75 N.E. 404 (1905).
218. E.g., Apex Leasing Co. v. Litke, 173 App. Div. 323, 159 N.Y. Supp. 707
(Ist Dep't. 1916).
219. See the discussion of the New York cases in note 30 stpra. E.g. Mosson
v. Kriser, 212 App. Div. 282, 208 N.Y. Supp. 566 (1st Dep't 192) ; and see the
discussion in text supra, at notes 77 to 86.
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be applied to businesses with no stocks of goods. To the contrary even
the more liberal New York cases dealing with the applicability of the
statute to manufacturers have insisted that some merchandise be sold
before the sale could be considered as coming under the statute.2 2 0
It is true that both the Appellate Division and Court of Appeals opin-
ions were memorandum opinions, and that the applicability of the
statute seems almost to be assumed rather than decided, yet it is
difficult, in view of the vast number of New York cases on the subject,
to conclude that the decision was not a conscious one. In any event,
it is a clearly incorrect and unjustified holding, gauged by any criteria
which the writer could conceive to be appropriate.
h. Miscellneous.
The variety of possible businesses as well as slight distinctions be-
tween substantially identical businesses has made it impossible not to
anticipate the subject-matter of this section. Nevertheless, there yet
remain certain kinds of establishments which it has not proven con-
venient to discuss in connection with the major groupings, but which
need attention. Here, even more than in the other cases, the idea is
evident that the judiciary must play an important and perhaps domi-
nant part in the lawmaking process whenever the legislatures choose
to handle broadly a problem of a complex nature covering variant fact
situations.
With but one exception"' I the cases to be discussed here involve
businesses in which the preponderant "product" sold is services, but
which have as a part of their business the sale of some items which
cannot be classified exclusively as services. In a few of the cases, the
non-service element has been regarded as so insubstantial as to be
regarded as de minimis by the courts, with the result that the particu-
lar business has been excluded on the ground that it is, for all practical
purposes, exclusively a service establishment. 2 2
Typical of the problems seen in this area are the cases which involve
the sale of a poolroom. The usual poolroom proprietor has a showcase
containing cigars and other tobacco, perhaps candy bars, oftentimes a
cooler for soft drinks. In a sense he is a retailer of the tobacco and
soft drinks, but the courts have not taken the position that the whole
poolroom is covered by bulk sales legislation merely because of the
fact of some incidental sales of tobacco and candy.2 23 It is true, how-
ever, that some cases have separated the tobacco and candy from the
220. E.g., Matter of Sunshine Stores, Inc., 264 App. Div. 930, 36 N.Y.S.2d 2(3d Dep't 1942).
221. Prins v. American Trust Co., 169 Ark. 455, 275 S.W. 914 (1925).
222. Wright v. Aaron, 214 Ark. 254, 215 S.W.2d 725 (1948); Ferrat v. Adam-
son, 53 Mont. 172, 163 Pac. 112 (1917).
223. See note 222 supra. But see, Bac Corp. v. Welsh, 33 Del. Co. R. 113, 115(194).
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other goods owned by the seller and have held the act applicable to
the former but not to the latter.2 4 Obviously, if the poolroom is run
merely as an adjunct to a more substantial enterprise which has char-
acteristics of a retail store, such as a confectionary, at least the con-
fectionary part of the business would be included.225
Another enterprise giving rise to a similar problem is the under-
taking business. Almost invariably an undertaker maintains a stock
of caskets, casket hardware, steel vaults, and robes which he sells to
his customers, usually as part of a single transaction which also in-
cludes his services. In one case involving such a business, the court,
without any discussion, treated a sale of the business as included
within the statute without any effort to distinguish the various items
sold. 22 6 In People's Savings Bank v. Van Allsbug,227 however, the
Supreme Court of Michigan found that caskets, steel vaults, robes and
casket hardware maintained as a stock by an undertaker constituted
merchandise within the meaning of that term in the statute, but re-
fused to hold that a funeral car, casket wagon, harness, buggy and
other impedimenta were either merchandise or fixtures, and so ex-
cluded them.
228
224. McPartin v. Clarkson, 240 Mich. 390, 215 N.W. 338 (1927); Independent
Breweries Co. v. Lawton, 200 Mo. App. 238, 204 S.W. 730 (1918). In Rothchild
v. State of Indiana, 200 Ind. 501, 165 N.E. 60 (1929), a perjury prosecution
based on a statement by the seller of a poolroom with the usual cigar and soft-
drink stand that there were no claims of any kind against the property, a convic-
tion was reversed on the ground that there was no lien on the property prior to
the consummation of the bulk sale. There is no discussion of the issue of whether
there was any necessity for complying with the bulk sales statute under such
circumstances, but had the court considered the problem and decided that there
was no need for compliance, a simple statement that such a business was not
included would have been an easier answer than the one given. N.M. Uri & Co.
v. McCroskey, 135 Ark. 537, 205 S.W. 976 (1918).
225. This may have been the situation in Bac Corporation v. Welsh, 33 Del.
Co. R. 113 (1944).
226. Ledwidge v. Arkansas National Bank, 135 Ark. 420, 205 S.W. 808 (1918).
227. 165 Mich. 524, 131 N.W. 101 (1911).
228. The history of the third piece of litigation involving undertakers is an
interesting if confusing one. The first appeal, Dallas Coffin Co. v. Yeager, 19
S.W.2d 156 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929), raised only the issue of whether a purchaser
was entitled to rely on the seller's oral statement that he had no creditors, and
this was decided adversely to the purchaser. No question was raised as to the
applicability of the bulk sales statute to an undertaking business. On the second
appeal, Yeager v. Dallas Coffin Co., 46 S.W.2d 1016 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932), the
court apparently accepted the rationale underlying the Michigan case, but found
that part of the articles in question did not constitute merchandise, and that the
articles which might constitute merchandise were not adequately described to
permit their allocation to that class. Finally, on the third appeal, Yeager v.
Dallas Coffin Co., 69 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934), the court pointed out that
there had now been five trials and three appeals in the case. The court then
emphasized the necessity for a showing that some articles sold had been indis-
criminately exhibited to the public as well as the applicability of the derogation
rule to the statute. The court finally concluded that there was no evidence in the
record before it that any of the articles had ever been indiscriminately exhibited
for sale to the public, reversed a judgment for the creditor, and entered finaljudgment for the purchaser.
Although the framework of the case seems to rest on the idea that a proper
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Another group of cases relates to the sale of hotel businesses. Al-
though not universally true, most hotels have both barrooms and
restaurants as an integral part of the establishment. Presumably, at
least in-so-far as the sale of the restaurant and bar business is con-
cerned, that ought to be covered by the statute if it is covered when
operated independently of a hotel.--"' The courts, however, have re-
garded hotels along with their appurtenances as sui generis and have
almost uniformly held them to fall outside the scope of the statutes.23°
Another class of cases which have caused some difficulty is that
involving contractors. In some cases the contractor may provide only
services, as in the case of a typical building contractor. In that situa-
tion the rules applicable to businesses which sell only services should
apply.'-* But frequently a specialty contractor provides material as
weil as services, and a problem not dissimilar from those found in the
record was not made, yet there arises a gnawing suspicion that by 1934 the court
may have changed its mind as to whether it is possible under any circumstances
to show that something sold by an undertaker is merchandise.
229. The problem was squarely presented in Pacific States Savings and Loan
Company v. Wagner, 14 Cal. App. 2d 126, 57 P.2d 997 (1936). The California
statute (CAL. CiM. CODE § 3440.1 [Supp. 1953]) expressly covers restaurants but
makes no mention of hotels. A chattel mortgage was placed on all the furniture,
fixtures and equipment located in a hotel including some property used in connec-
tion with a dining room and kitchen operated in the hotel. At least 75% of the
dining room business came from hotel patrons, the rest coming from the public
venerally. The hotel had advertised its dining room as open to the public. The
.ou it held the business outside the scope of the statute, saying:
It is a matter of common knowledge that hotels ordinarily maintain dining
rooms as part of the hotel business and that ordinarily the public may obtain
meals at hotel dining rooms without obtaining lodgings and without register-
ing as guests. It must be presumed that the members of the legislature were
aware of these conditions and that the section of the code under discussion
was enacted in the light of such knowledge. The legislature enumerated
certain businesses the ow-ners of which were required to file the notice pre-
scribed in order to make a valid mortgage but the legislature did not include
in this list a number of other businesses, among them that of a hotel owner.
Therefore a hotel owner was not required to file the notice referred to. It is
not necessary to define the words restaurant and hotel to demonstrate that
the business conducted by plaintiff in its dining room should be classified as
that of hotel business rather than restaurant business. If the legislature had
meant to require a hotel owner to file the notice referred to in section 3440
in order to execute a mortgage on that part of the hotel fixtures used in the
dining room, it would have been a simple matter to so specify in the statute.
I4. at 128, 57 P.2d at 998.
It might be suggested that although the legislature did not choose to include
hotels, it did choose to include restaurants, and it did not differentiate restaurants
located in and part of hotels from other restnurants.
230. Meier Electric and Machine Co. v. Dixon, 81 Ind. App. 400, 143 N.E. 363
11921); Stewart v. Sulger, 174 App. Div. 88, 161 N.Y. Supp. 489 (3d Dep't
1916); Oberlin v. Harokopas, 44 Ohio App. 111, 184 N.E. 257 (1932); Alervine v.
Indian Queen Hotel Corp., 11 Pa. D. & C. 353 (1928); Kemp and Davis v. Corbin
& Co,, 22 Pa. Dist. 215 (1912). In Wettlaufer v. Rogers, 172 Misc. 554, 15 N.Y.S.
2d 644 (Sup. Ct. 1939), the court, relying on the Steart. case held the statute in-
applicable to a boarding-house. Cotra, Stumpp & Walter Co. v. Napanoch Coun-
try Club, Inc., 198 Misc. 600, 102 N.Y.S.2d 489 (Sup. Ct. 1950). Hotels are ex-
pressly covered by the provisions of IDAHO CODE ANN. § 64-701 (1948); UTAH
COD ANN. § 25-2-1 (1953); WASH. REV. CODE § 63.08.010 (1951).
221. Northrop v. Finn Construction Co., 260 Pa. 15, 103 AtI. 544 (1918).
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repair shop cases arises. Although in Axtefl Co. v. Wor 232 the Court
of Civil Appeals of Texas held that a plumbing contractor who
furnished the materials which were used in doing the work did not fall
within the statute on the ground that the sale of the materials was
merely incidental to the chief business of selling labor and mechanical
skill, the holdings are not unanimous.
Two cases are of special significance, one decided under the broadly-
worded and broadly-interpreted Illinois statute,23 18 the other under the
New York statute.2 34 In Corrigan v. Miler,35 the Illinois court held
that under the earlier interpretations given the Illinois statute by the
Supreme Court of that state, it was not confined to mercantile busi-
nesses, but applied to any sale in bulk of the goods and chattels of any
business and so included a Tile-Tex and marble contractor. Mott v.
Reeves,236 however, is not so easily explained. The New York statute
in force at the time covered transactions only when some merchandise
was included in them. The seller was a retail merchant who engaged
in wiring buildings and installing lighting fixtures as a sideline. The
contract price agreed upon in each case consisted of the cost of the
materials used, of which the seller kept a stock, plus the cost of the
installation work. Ordinarily the cost of installation was about one-
half of the total cost of any job. The stock maintained for this purpose
was sold without compliance with the statute. The court held the
statute applicable on the theory that these articles were merchandise
and that the fact that they were sold only in connection with a sale of
services did not destroy their character as merchandise. In answer to
the contention that these articles were like the raw materials of a
manufacturer, the court pointed out that they underwent almost no
change of form in the installation process.
It is difficult to distinguish these cases from those involving repair
shops. In the latter cases the courts have consistently held that the
fact that services make up a large part of what is actually sold is the
controlling factor in determining that the business is not an included
one. The same reasoning is just as appropriate in the contracting
cases.
23 7
232. 29 S.W.2d 421 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930).
233. Irl. Ax. STAT. c. 121%, § 78 (Supp. 1952).
234. N.Y. PERs. PRoP. LAw § 44.
235. 338 Ill. App. 212, 86 N.E.2d 853 (1949).
236. 125 Misc. 511, 211 N.Y. Supp. 375 (Sup. Ct. 1925), aff'd mem., 217 App.
Div. 718, 215 N.Y. Supp. 889 (4th Dep't 1926), aff'd without opinion, 246 N.Y.
567, 159 N.E. 654 (1927).
237. In Teich v. McAuley, 212 S.W. 979 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919), a seller was
engaged in the business of buying marble and making it into monuments. The
court, without adverting to the change of form necessarily involved in such an
operation, held that the stock of marble constituted a stock of merchandise within
the statute. The result here is not consistent with those reached in later Texas
cases involving manufactories. See, e.g., Tomforde v. Mitchell Const. Co., 91
S.W.2d 1137 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936).
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In one unusual case, Ben Bimberg & Co., Inc. v. Unity Coat and
Apron Co., ' the court held that the supplying of certain articles for
temporary use was a business covered by the New York bulk sales
statute on the ground that the supplied articles constituted a stock of
merchandise. The business consisted of supplying laundered coats,
aprons and other laundered articles to its customers for a certain price.
When soiled, the articles were returned and replaced by others. The
court took the position that the articles supplied were merchandise
and that the fact that they were rented rather than sold was immate-
rial. Although these items could constitute a stock of merchandise of
an establishment whose business it was to sell them, it is completely in-
consistent with all the other decisions to say that they were merchan-
dise even though rented. The establishment was a service establish-
ment, and its character was not changed by that fact that the service
it rendered consisted of renting tangible chattels which were con-
stantly replaced by other like chattels.
The single case which falls under this section and which did not
involve a business in which the sale of services predominated is Prins
v. American Trust Co. 3- There the seller operated a number of large
plantations and maintained a retail store which sold to the plantation
tenants. The Supreme Court of Arkansas held that the sale of the
retail store was interdicted by the statute, refusing to apply the rule
of "incidental sales," which it had developed in a series of decisions
involving manufactories and repair shops.240 Since the retail store
was a substantial business in itself, the Court felt that the fact that
it was used to supply only tenants of the owner's plantation was im-
material, a decision which is irrefutably sound.
In summary, the courts have, in the case of businesses which involve
elements of several of the principal categories, demonstrated some
tendency to separate out the various elements of the business and to
treat each element by itself for bulk sales purposes, unless the mer-
chandise aspects of the business have been so insubstantial either ab-
solutely or relatively, as to be regarded as merely incidental to a more
significant but excluded business.
III. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
The Uniform Commercial Code,:", a joint product of the American
Law Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws, has defined the enterprises which fall within the
238. 150 Misc. 836, 270 N.Y. Supp. 580 (Sup. Ct. 1934).
239. 169 Ark. 455, 275 S.W. 914 (1925).
240. See text at notes 93 to 96, and 113 to 114, supra.
241. All references are to the Official Draft, Text and Comments Edition, 1952,
as revised by the Recommendations of the Editorial Board for Changes in the
Text and Comments of the Uniform Commercial Code Official Draft, Text and
Comments Edition, June 1, 1953. Two general articles have appeared on the sub-ject of the Bulk Transfers Article of the Code. See Billig, Article 6-Order Out
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scope of its Bulk Transfers Article242 as ". . . all those whose prin-
cipal business is the sale of merchandise from stock, including those
who manufacture what they sell ... .,1243 Thus, the line is drawn at a
somewhat different place from where it is drawn under the over-
whelming majority of the cases decided under current statutes, since
it includes manufacturing businesses. More precisely, the question
which is determinative of whether a particular business falls within
or without the statute is, whether its "principal business is the sale
not of merchandise but of services. 24, Comment 2 to the section
we are considering enumerates specifically as excluded business
".. . farming, . . . contracting, . . professional services,... such
things as cleaning shops, barber shops, pool halls, hotels, restaurants,
and the like. . . . 145 Obviously, the list is not intended to be ex-
haustive.
The comment also states as the reason for excluding such businesses
that while ". . . some bulk sales risk exists in the excluded businesses,
they have in common the fact that unsecured credit is not commonly
extended on the faith of a stock of merchandise. ' ' 4 It is my belief
that not only is this the criterion which underlies the case law under
the existing statutes, although it does not seem to have been made
explicit in those cases, but further that it is the only appropriate crite-
rion. It represents a recognition of how in fact certain businesses are
financed, and presumably finds that such financing methods are
proper. Stated differently, it is based on the idea that the commercial
law should be designed to facilitate commercial practices where such
practices are both sound and up-to-date.
A further objective of commercial law is certainty. Not only the
section under consideration, but the Bulk Sales Article as a whole,
makes a substantial contribution to the attainment of that objective
by more carefully delineating the situations in which it is necessary to
comply with it.2 47
of Chaos; A Bulk Transfers Article Emerges, 1952 Wis. L. Rv. 312; Miller, The
Effect of the Bulk Sales Article on Existing Commercial Practices, 16 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PsO0. 267 (1951). The article has been discussed with reference primarily
to local law in Larson, Bulk Sales: Texas Law and the Uniform Commercial
Code, 6 SoUTwEsTmN L.J. 417 (1952) and in D. B. T., Article 6-Bulk Trans-fers, 17 ALS. U. :Rv. 192 (1953). The Article is also discussed in Weintraub and
Levin, Hulk Sales Law and Adeqate Protection of Creditors, 65 HAuv. L. Rzv.
418 (1952).l a
242. UxFOR CO 1 RAL Cons Art. 6 (Official Draf 9 srevised by the
Recommendations of the Editorial Board for Changes in the Text and Comments
of the Uniform Commercial Code Official Draft, Text and Comments Edition,
June 1, 1953).243. Id., § 6-102 (3).
244. Id., § 6-102, Comment 2.
245. Ibid.
246. Ibid.
247. Miller, supra note 241, passim.
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IV. SUMMARY AND CRITIQUE
Although no business, professional services excepted, has been held
to fall outside the scope of every bulk sales statute, yet there is sub-
stantial uniformity as to many kinds of businesses. Thus, retailers
invariably, and wholesalers almost uniformly, are included. While
most of the cases exclude manufacturers, still there is a substantial
number of cases which suggest inclusion under some circumstances.
Establishments which provided only services are almost uniformly
excluded, and, in general, those businesses in which the sale of services
predominate are excluded, although many courts have scrutinized such
businesses more closely in order to determine whether the sale of
goods formed a substantial part of the business, and have included
them if the answer was yes. Farmers have been almost universally
excluded.
Although much of the reasoning in the cases is unsatisfactory in
the sense that the underlying reasons for decision are not formulated,
or at least are not stated in the opinion, and although all too many of
the decisions are beclouded by constant references to restricting rules
of statutory construction in a situation where an examination of the
whole mass of cases indicates that such rules play no really important
part in the decision-making process, still an examination of that mass
of decisions suggests a groping toward a criterion, a criterion which
has not as yet been made explicit in any of the cases. That criterion,
I believe, is the one utilized by the draftsman of the Bulk Sales Article
of the Uniform Commercical Code, namely, whether unsecured credit
i' or-dinarily advanced on the faith of a stock of merchandise24
The bulk transfer problem is a complex one, and the temptation is
strong for the legislature to lay down only broad outlines with the
idea of having the courts fill in the details. In my opinion that tempta-
tion should be resisted to the utmost in the field of commercial law.
In no other field of the law are decisions to act in a certain way so
frequently made on the basis of the applicable rules of law. It is neces-
sary, therefore, that those rules be stated with maximum precision.
It follows that the initial rule, the legislative rule, should be as precise
as possible in this area. This is not to say that a statute should attempt
to list every possible kind of business, however. The difficulties at-
tendant upon such a scheme become apparent when we suppose the
situation of a business which the legislature has, understandingly
enough, simply forgotten to include. It should be possible, however,
by careful drafting, and the Uniform Commercial Code has proven
this point, to delineate the bulk transfer situations in such a way as
to make predictability of judicial result very high, in fact to render
248. Supra, note 244.
Washington University Open Scholarship
48 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
unnecessary much potential litigation because of that high predicta-
bility. Indeed I would go so far as to suggest that the need for pre-
cision in this area is almost as important as the selection of the correct
criterion for exclusion and inclusion. While the ultimate decision on
the soundness of any legislation must await the cases decided under it,
for the decisions under a statute are a substantial factor in the meas-
urement of its success, yet I am willing to state that the Uniform Com-
mercial Code has provided a solution in which both objectives have
been met admirably.249
249. See articles by Billig and Miller supra note 241.
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